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INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND
THE LIFE-CYCLE APPROACH TO SOCIAL INSURANCE
Peter Birch Sørensen, Martin Ino Hansen and A. Lans Bovenberg1
1. Introduction
Many welfare states are under strain as a result of globalization, aging, and technological
change biased against low-skilled workers. While these trends have received much at-
tention, it is less frequently recognized that the changing nature of social risks also puts
the welfare state under pressure. To illustrate, as the economy shifts from blue-collar
work in industrial sectors to white-collar work in service sectors and knowledge-intensive
activities, mental causes of sickness and disability become more prominent. These types
of sickness and disability are less easy to diagnose and verify than those with physical
causes, thereby increasing the danger of moral hazard. Moreover, changes in technology
and in the organization of work have made many segments of the labour market more
’fluid’, as people move more frequently between employers and as they enter and exit the
labour force more often. In such a transitional labor market it becomes more diﬃcult to
verify whether a person is voluntarily or involuntarily out of work, again exacerbating the
problem of moral hazard in social insurance. Thus, whereas the dynamic world economy
confronts many people with increasing economic risks, the ability of the welfare state
to oﬀer security is weakened, as globalization increases the mobility of tax bases and as
the changing nature of human-capital risks raises the costs of insuring these risks. The
age-old trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency as well as the related dilemma between
insurance and incentives are more relevant than ever before.
Against this background, we analyze the merits of mandatory individual saving ac-
counts that are supplemented by public liquidity insurance and public lifetime income
insurance. Mandatory payments in personal saving accounts that finance social insur-
ance payments (including deductibles and insurance premiums) replace taxes that are
currently financing social-insurance benefits. At retirement, the remaining balances in
1We are grateful to Steen Jørgensen and Anne Kristine Høj for methodological advice regarding the
estimation of lifetime incomes. Any remaining shortcomings are our own responsibility.
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the accounts are converted into an annuity, which is added to the ordinary public re-
tirement benefit. If the account balance is negative at that time, the account is set to
zero and the account holder simply receives the ordinary retirement benefit. We explore
to what extent such accounts can improve incentives without substantially increasing
lifetime inequality and lifetime risk. The motivation behind these accounts is that they
facilitate consumption smoothing throughout the life cycle without creating substantial
disincentives to work. These accounts therefore limit the inescapable labour-market dis-
tortions that are associated with lifetime redistribution, lifetime insurance and liquidity
insurance. In particular, the accounts establish an eﬃciency-enhancing actuarial link
between contributions and benefits for high-income and middle-income workers (who
currently pay distortionary taxes partly to finance distortionary social benefits to them-
selves) without harming low-income workers who remain protected by the lifetime income
guarantee. This actuarial link reduces the tax character of social security contributions
and thus enhances incentives to work. The accounts also help to improve the trade-oﬀ
between insurance and incentives by facilitating self-insurance over the life course. In
particular, they allow people to shift the payment of deductibles in social insurance to
the periods in which these costs can be more easily aﬀorded. In this way, individuals can
self-insure themselves over their life course — and thus do not have to rely on insurance
that gives rise to moral hazard.
To motivate the life-cycle approach to social insurance adopted in this paper, we
start by documenting the rather low degree to which current social-insurance programs
redistribute lifetime incomes. Using Danish data, we find that about three-fourths of the
taxes levied to fund public transfers merely finance benefits that redistribute income over
the same taxpayer’s life cycle rather than between diﬀerent people. We also identify those
social-insurance programs that imply a high degree of lifetime income redistribution and
therefore would not be suited for financing via individual saving accounts. Following this
empirical analysis, we explain the theoretical rationale for mandatory saving accounts for
social insurance. We argue that a properly designed account system has the potential
to generate a Pareto improvement, from not only an ex-ante perspective (i.e. before
people know which shocks they are going to encounter during their lives) but also from
an ex-post point of view (i.e. after all shocks have materialized). To illustrate how an
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account system might work in practice, we proceed to lay out a specific proposal for a
reform of the Danish system of social insurance, involving the use of individual accounts.
We then estimate how this reform would aﬀect the distribution of lifetime incomes, the
public budget and economic eﬃciency. Our analysis suggests that, even with conservative
assumptions regarding labor-supply elasticities, the proposed reform would indeed imply
a Pareto improvement and would involve only a minor increase in the inequality of lifetime
income distribution.
Other studies have explored lifetime distribution and how it is aﬀected by public
policy. Nelissen (1998) employs a micro-simulation model to investigate how social insur-
ance aﬀects income distribution on a lifetime basis in the Netherlands. Similar studies
for the United States include Coronado et al. (2000), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000),
and Liebman (2001). These studies find that social insurance helps to redistribute from
the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. The contribution of social insurance to the redistri-
bution of lifetime incomes, however, is considerably smaller than what is suggested by its
contribution to the redistribution of annual incomes. To illustrate, Nelissen (1998) finds
that the Dutch social-insurance system reduces annual income inequality by 45 percent
but lifetime inequality only by between 15 and 30 percent (depending on the discount
rate and on the historical cohort considered). Ter Rele (2003) covers a broader range of
Dutch governmental programs, but does not account for all heterogeneity and restricts
himself to an analysis of the life cycles of six educational groups. He finds that public
programs substantially reduce inequality on a lifetime basis. Whereas lifetime tax liabil-
ities are proportional to lifetime incomes, lifetime benefits of public spending do not vary
with lifetime income.
To estimate the degree to which the public sector redistributes lifetime income, this
paper uses a method that was previously applied by Hussénius and Selén (1994), Falk-
ingham and Harding (1996), O’Donoghue (2001), and Pettersson and Pettersson (2003).
Section 2.3 explains this method and compares the results from these previous studies to
our own findings.
Fölster (1997, 1999), Orszag and Snower (1997, 2002), Feldstein and Altman (1998),
Orszag et al. (1999), Fölster et al. (2002), Stiglitz and Yun (2002), Sørensen (2003)
and Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) analyze the merits of various types of individual
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saving accounts. Some of these studies investigate how individual accounts for the fi-
nancing of unemployment benefits could improve labour-market incentives compared to
a tax-financed system of unemployment insurance. Fölster (1997, 1999) estimates how
individual accounts financing a broader set of social-insurance programs would aﬀect the
distribution of lifetime incomes in Sweden, given that the account system includes life-
time income insurance as well as liquidity insurance. We conduct a similar exercise for
Denmark in this paper. In contrast to Fölster (1997, 1999), we also explore how the sys-
tem of individual accounts aﬀects work incentives, allowing us to compute the eﬃciency
gains and the consequences for the government budget. Moreover, we design our proposal
in such a way that it is Pareto improving.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 estimates how much the
various social-insurance benefits redistribute lifetime incomes as compared to annual
incomes. Section 3 investigates the advantages and disadvantages of individual accounts
with a lifetime-income guarantee as an instrument to enhance labor-market incentives
without harming the lifetime poor. Section 4 analyzes how individual accounts aﬀect
the distribution of lifetime incomes, the labor market, the public budget and economic
eﬃciency. Section 5 concludes. Two technical appendices document some of the results
reported in the main text.
2. Redistribution over the life cycle versus redistribution of life-
time incomes: a case study of the Danish welfare state
In the modern Western European welfare state a substantial part of the taxes paid by
the average taxpayer finance public transfers that are channelled back to the same tax-
payer at some point in the life cycle. This section presents a case study of the Danish
welfare state indicating that only about one-fourth of social-insurance transfers helps to
redistribute income from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. We also present estimates
of the diﬀerent degrees to which the various social-insurance benefits redistribute lifetime
incomes as compared to annual incomes. Several benefits that appear to be highly re-
distributive in a cross-section analysis based on annual incomes turn out to have little
redistributive power when we adopt a life-cycle perspective.
The analysis in this section provides the empirical motivation for the life-cycle ap-
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proach to social insurance laid out in section 3. Moreover, the empirical material pre-
sented in this section helps to identify those types of social insurance benefits that seem
particularly well suited for finance via individual saving accounts. The present section
therefore provides an important background for the specific reform proposal for Denmark
presented in section 4.
2.1. Estimating lifetime incomes
To evaluate how the welfare state aﬀects the distribution of lifetime incomes, one must
construct measures of lifetime incomes and their distribution across the population in
the absence and presence of taxes and transfers. For many years, the secretariat of
the Danish Economic Council (DEC) has constructed such measures to highlight trends
in the Danish income distribution.2 The empirical analysis in this paper employs the
most recent estimates of lifetime incomes in Denmark, presented in the council’s report
from the spring of 2005 (Danish Economic Council, 2005). This subsection explains
the methodology used by the DEC; further details and documentation may be found in
Hansen (2005).
The estimates are based on a comprehensive micro panel data set covering the period
1994-2002 and comprising a representative sample of 10 percent of the Danish population
above the age of 18. The data include a wide range of socioeconomic variables plus infor-
mation on annual factor incomes, public transfers received and taxes paid. The recorded
factor incomes include an imputed return to owner-occupied housing, and incomes are
measured in 2002 income levels (i.e., incomes for other years are adjusted for average
nominal income growth), using an equivalence scale adjusting for economies of scale in
the consumption of multiperson households.
The data cover a time span of nine years in the lives of the various cohorts aged 18
and above in 1994. Lifetime incomes are estimated by matching individuals from diﬀerent
cohorts with otherwise similar observable characteristics. This procedure implicitly ab-
stracts from cohort eﬀects other than those stemming from the observable socioeconomic
2Established by the Danish parliament in 1962, the Economic Council is an independent think tank
advising the Danish government and parliament on issues of economic policy. The council is headed
by three academic economists who prepare two reports on the state of the Danish economy every year,
assisted by the professional economists in the council secretariat.
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characteristics included in the data set. By combining the observations for diﬀerent co-
horts, one obtains synthetic life cycles covering the age interval from the age of 18 until
the age of death of the oldest individual included in a given synthetic life cycle. The con-
structed life cycles thus exhibit diﬀerent lengths, and the tendency for higher-educated
people to live longer (and hence to benefit more from public pensions) is reflected in the
data.3
The starting point for the construction of synthetic life cycles is the cohort aged 42
years in 1994 and thus 50 years in 2002. A person in this group with certain characteristics
(Person 1) is matched with a person with similar characteristics who was 50 years old in
1994 (Person 2) in order to add observations of annual incomes in the age interval between
51 and 58. Similarly, Person 2 is matched with a person with similar characteristics
who was 58 years old in 1994 (Person 3) to add another eight-year age interval to the
constructed life cycle, and so on. Further, since Person 1 was 42 years old in 1994, he/she
is also matched with a similar person who was 42 years old in 2002 (Person 4) in order to
add observations for the age interval 34-41 years to the constructed life cycle, and Person
4 is in turn matched with a person who was 34 years of age in 2002, etc. This procedure
means that a synthetic life cycle ending at the age of, say, 82 is constructed on the basis
of data for eight diﬀerent individuals, with the youngest one being 18 years of age in 1994
and the oldest one being 74 years of age in that year.
The procedure described above started from the cohort that was 50 years of age in
2002. A similar procedure is repeated eight times, each time starting with a cohort that
was one year younger in 2002. The last set of synthetic life cycles is thus constructed by
starting with those individuals who were 43 years old in 2002. Since each of these eight
cohorts in the sample population includes more than 7,000 individuals, one ends up with
more than 58,000 synthetic Danish life cycles. Centering the construction of life cycles
around the cohorts aged 43-50 years in 2002 means that the resulting lifetime incomes
reflect the current level of education of middle-aged Danes rather than the higher (lower)
education level of younger (older) cohorts.
The purpose of the matching procedure is to ensure that the individuals who are
linked together in the same life cycle are as similar as possible in terms of the socioe-
3The average age of death in the constructed life cycles is 75 years.
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conomic characteristics determining lifetime income. Ideally one would like to match
individuals who are fully identical with respect to gender, education, family status, sec-
tor of employment etc., and who have identical incomes at the same age level. However,
although the sample population is large, such a matching procedure would imply a loss
of a large number of observations due to missing matches, since in most cases it would
be impossible to find individuals who are completely identical in terms of all observed
characteristics, including the income they earn at a given stage in their life cycle. The
matching of individuals is therefore carried out in two steps. The first step may be ex-
plained by going back to the cohort N5002 of individuals who were 50 years old in 2002.
Each of these persons needs to be matched with a similar person from the cohort N5094 of
people who were 50 years of age in 1994. For this purpose, all individuals within each of
these two cohorts are divided into 60 diﬀerent groups, categorized according to gender,
three diﬀerent levels of education, and ten deciles of annual disposable income. This
initial categorization ensures a significant degree of similarity between individuals who
are matched, since nobody from the cohort N5002 can be matched with a person from the
cohort N5094 who belongs to another group.
In the second step, an individual from cohort N5002 belonging to a given category X
(Person 1) is matched with an individual from cohort N5094 who also belongs to category
X and who has an expected annual disposable income as close as possible to the income
of Person 1 (recall that all incomes are measured in 2002 income levels and are thus
directly comparable). The expected disposable income for a 50-year old in 2002 (1994)
is estimated by running an OLS regression using data on all individuals who were in
the age interval 50-54 years in 2002 (1994), incorporating 53 diﬀerent socioeconomic
characteristics as explanatory variables, including family composition, detailed level of
education, employment status, ethnic background etc. In a similar way, the expected
disposable income of, say, a 37-year old individual is estimated by running regressions
on data of all individuals in the age interval 35-39 years in 1994 and 2002, respectively.
Matching individuals on the basis of expected rather than actual incomes eliminates the
eﬀects of random fluctuations in individual incomes and allows the matching to exploit
information on all the observable characteristics that tend to make the incomes of any two
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individuals converge.4 At the same time, the categorization into 60 groups undertaken in
the first step ensures that individuals who are matched always belong to the same decile
in the distribution of actual incomes.
Note that while individuals are matched on the basis of their expected disposable
income, the lifetime income in each synthetic life cycle is calculated from the actual ob-
served annual incomes of the individuals included in the constructed life course. Further,
although the matching is based on expected disposable income, the data set also allows
one to track the evolution of actual factor income throughout each constructed life cycle.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the relevant discount rate equals the average growth
rate of real income (in recent years the average interest rate on government bonds has
in fact been quite close to the rate of wage growth in Denmark). One may then simply
add up the annual incomes earned in each constructed life cycle to obtain an estimate of
lifetime incomes.
The final challenge is to estimate the distributional impact of the current tax-transfer
system. The taxes and transfers recorded in each synthetic life cycle are influenced by
policy rules dating back as far as 1994. To ensure that the taxes and transfers assigned to
each life course reflect current rather than historical policy rules, we replace the recorded
actual tax and transfer payments by the estimated tax-transfer payments that would
have materialized in case the most recent policy rules would have prevailed throughout
each individual life cycle. Specifically, the tax payments and transfers assigned to each
synthetic life cycle are based on average observed payments for the years 2000-2002. For
a person aged 50 years in 2002, this average payment is imputed to each of the years in
the age interval 46-53 years in the synthetic life cycle in which he is included. To the
age interval 54-61 years, one imputes the average annual amount of taxes and transfers
recorded for 2000-2002 for the person in that same synthetic life cycle who was 58 years
old in 2002; to the interval 38-45 years, one assigns the average 2000-2002 taxes and
transfers for a person who was 42 years old in 2002, and so on. In this way, one obtains
estimates of taxes and transfers over the entire life course, assuming that the tax-transfer
4This matching methodology is similar to the method of propensity-score matching, which has gained
popularity in recent years as a means of matching treatment groups with appropriate control groups
when evaluating the eﬀects of various public-policy programs (see, e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005).
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rules in the period 2000-2002 prevail over the full life cycles of all individuals.5
Table 1 compares the estimated distribution of lifetime incomes with the observed
distribution of annual incomes in 2002. Average factor incomes have been normalized to
100, so that all numbers in the table are measured in percent of average factor income.
To facilitate comparison of the total incomes earned over life cycles of diﬀerent lengths,
and to allow comparison with the cross-section data on annual incomes reported in the
upper part of the table, we divide all lifetime incomes by the number of years in the
constructed life cycle in order to obtain a measure of the average income earned per year.
Gross income is defined as the sum of factor income and the pre-tax public transfers
received. Disposable income equals gross income minus direct taxes paid.
As might be expected, the distribution of annual income is much more unequal than
the distribution of lifetime income. Measured by the reduction in the Gini coeﬃcient,
transfers have a greater equalizing impact than direct taxes, whether distribution is
measured on an annual or on a lifetime basis. The diﬀerence between the Gini coeﬃcients
for the distribution of factor income and disposable income is sometimes taken as a
measure of the total redistributive impact of the tax-transfer system. An obvious problem
with this approach is that the distribution of factor income may be significantly aﬀected
by the tax-transfer system. With this important proviso in mind, we see from Table
1 that transfers and direct taxes cut the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of lifetime
income roughly in half. Interestingly, in relative terms, this reduction in inequality is
slightly larger than the policy-induced 45 percent reduction in the Gini coeﬃcient for the
distribution of annual income. In absolute terms, however, the tax-transfer system has a
larger negative impact on the Gini coeﬃcient if income is measured on an annual basis
rather than a lifetime basis.
(Table 1 about here)
5This procedure is necessitated by the fact that the period 2000-2002 only includes observations of
tax/transfer payments during three years of each of the eight—year intervals making up a synthetic life
cycle. Undoubtedly, our procedure implies an overstatement of the degree of persistence in individual
tax payments and transfer receipts from one year to the next in the life cycle. However, over the course
of an entire life cycle - which is the perspective adopted here - our procedure is unlikely to imply a
systematic bias in the amount of taxes and transfers assigned to the various lifetime income deciles.
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2.2. The redistributive impact of social-insurance transfers
Tables 2 through 4 describe the redistributive eﬀects of the most important social-
insurance transfers in the Danish welfare state. Based on cross-section data for 2002,
Table 2 shows the fraction of annual disposable income accounted for by the various
transfers in each of the deciles in the distribution of annual incomes. Table 3, in con-
trast, displays the fraction of disposable lifetime income accounted for by these same
transfers in the various deciles of the lifetime income distribution, using the estimates of
lifetime incomes presented in section 2.1.6
(Tables 2 and 3 about here)
Utilizing the information contained in Tables 2 and 3, Table 4 reports the redistrib-
utive impact of the various social-insurance transfers, measured by the ’redistribution
index’. The point of departure for calculating the redistribution index is a standard
Lorenz-curve diagram, in which the population is ranked according to income deciles
along the horizontal axis and where the vertical axis measures the share of total income
earned by the poorest X percent of the population. In addition to the Lorenz curve, such
a diagram may include a concentration curve measuring the fraction of total spending
on some social-insurance benefit accruing to the poorest X percent of the population. If
people in poorer deciles receive a larger share of total spending on the transfer considered,
the concentration curve will lie above the 45-degree line; in the hypothetical case of an
identical lump-sum transfer to all citizens, the concentration curve will coincide with the
45-degree line. The redistribution index is defined as the area between the concentration
curve and the Lorenz curve, measured in proportion to the total area below the 45-degree
line. The greater the value of this index, the more redistributive is the transfer in ques-
tion. Table 4 normalizes the redistribution index by reporting the excess value of the
6According to tables 2 and 3, early retirement benefits are a larger percentage of lifetime income than
annual income in 2002, whereas the opposite is the case for child benefits and parental leave benefits.
The diﬀerence with respect to early retirement benefits stems from the fact that the cohort of individuals
who were between 43 and 50 year old in 2002 (the cohort around which our synthetic life cycles was
centred) was significantly larger than the cohort that was entitled to early retirement benefits in 2002.
At the same time, the 43-50 year olds in 2002 had a relatively low fertility rate, so in our synthetic life
cycles these people collect a relatively small amount of child benefits and parental leave benefits.
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index above the value of the redistribution index for an identical lump-sum transfer to all
individuals. The index numbers in Table 4 thus indicate how much more redistributive
the various transfers are compared to a uniform lump-sum transfer.
(Table 4 about here)
The first column in Table 4 shows the extent to which the most important social-
insurance benefits help to redistribute annual incomes. In an annual perspective, social
assistance benefits and education benefits are the most redistributive transfers. Also
housing benefits and supplementary retirement benefits (which are means-tested) gener-
ate substantial redistributive eﬀects. In a lifetime perspective, most transfer programs
exert a smaller eﬀect on the income distribution. Moreover, the ranking of the various
transfers according to their redistributive impact changes significantly, as shown by the
second column in Table 4. Social assistance remains the most redistributive program,
but its redistributive eﬀect is significantly smaller in a life-cycle context. Transfers such
as parental leave benefits and the basic retirement benefit (which is a flat benefit granted
to all Danish residents above the age of 65) that yield a significant impact on the distri-
bution of annual incomes exert (almost) the same eﬀect on the distribution of lifetime
incomes as an identical lump-sum transfer to all individuals. Most strikingly, whereas
education benefits are highly redistributive in an annual context, they generate only small
eﬀects on lifetime income distribution. Disability benefits, in contrast, yield a stronger
redistributive impact in a lifetime perspective than in an annual perspective.
2.3. Interpersonal versus intrapersonal redistribution
Table 4 suggests that a large fraction of the taxes levied to finance public transfers
serves to finance redistribution over the same individual’s life cycle. But exactly how
large is this fraction? To answer this question, we adopt a methodology previously used
by Hussénius and Selén (1994), Falkingham and Harding (1996), O’Donoghue (2001),
and Pettersson and Pettersson (2003). In applying this method, we use the constructed
synthetic life cycles described in section 2.1 as an input. Our calculations account for all
public transfers paid to Danish households. These benefits include all of those mentioned
in Table 4 plus a few others that only make up a minor share of total transfers.
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The first step in the calculation is to identify the fraction of taxes serving to finance
social-insurance transfers. The total social-insurance benefits received over the life cycles
of the representative sample of Danish households included in our data set amount to
43.7 percent of the total direct and indirect taxes paid by these same individuals over
their lifetimes, with the remaining fraction of taxes serving to finance other categories of
public spending. In our main scenario we therefore assume that 43.7 percent of direct
and indirect taxes are ’reserved’ for the financing of social-insurance benefits. The direct
taxes paid by each individual in each year of his/her life cycle are explicitly included in
our data set, so we take 43.7 percent of these payments to represent the financing of social
insurance. Individual payments of indirect taxes are not explicitly included in our data,
however, so these payments have to be estimated. According to the Danish Ministry of
Finance (2002), the indirect taxes paid by the average Danish taxpayer amount to 22.3
percent of disposable income, varying from 37.4 percent of annual disposable income in
the bottom income decile to 16.4 percent of annual disposable income in the top decile.
We use these estimates to impute indirect tax payments to all individuals in our sample,
accounting for the income decile to which they belong in each year of their life cycle.
The fraction of income devoted to indirect taxes thus varies as individuals move from one
place in the annual income distribution to another over the life cycle.7 Having allocated
indirect taxes across individuals in this way, we assume that 43.7 of these payments are
’reserved’ for the financing of social-insurance benefit.
We now wish to separate the interpersonal redistribution achieved via the social-
insurance system (i.e. redistribution of lifetime incomes from rich to poor) from the
intrapersonal redistribution (i.e. redistribution over the individual’s life cycle). We there-
fore define the net lifetime transfer received by individual i over the life cycle as
Ni =
X
t
(Bit − Tit) , (2.1)
where Bit denotes transfers received by individual i in year t, and Tit is the part of indi-
vidual i’s direct and indirect tax payment in year t that is ’reserved’ for the financing of
7This procedure assumes that saving rates depend only on income. Our data set does not allow us to
estimate how saving rates depend on other household characteristics. Below we shall consider a scenario
where social transfers are assumed to be financed only out of direct taxes so that we do not have to make
any assumptions regarding indirect tax payments.
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social insurance. The total interpersonal redistribution achieved in a life-cycle perspec-
tive (INTER) is found by aggregating the net lifetime transfers across those individuals
for whom the net transfer received is positive:
INTER =
X
i
(Ni | Ni > 0) = −
X
i
(Ni | Ni < 0) . (2.2)
The intrapersonal redistribution can be split into two components. Within any year
in which an individual receives a transfer, he/she will also pay some amount of tax (at
least indirect tax), so that part of the transfer received is self-financed. We define the
part of the transfer financed by the taxpayer himself within the same year as
SYit = min (Bit, Tit) . (2.3)
Another part of the transfers received over the life cycle is financed by the recipient
himself via the taxes paid in the other years of his life. This self-financing of benefits via
the ’reserved’ taxes paid in some other year may be calculated as
OYi =
X
t
(Tit − SYit) if Ni > 0, (2.4)
OYi =
X
t
(Bit − SYit) if Ni ≤ 0. (2.5)
The total intrapersonal redistribution (INTRA) is the sum of the self-financing by
all individuals within the same year and across their life cycles:
INTRA =
X
i
X
t
SYit +
X
i
OYi. (2.6)
We have now decomposed total transfer payments into interpersonal and intrapersonal
redistribution, since the definitions given above imply that
INTER+ INTRA =
X
i
X
t
Tit =
X
i
X
t
Bit. (2.7)
Table 5, taken from Hansen (2005, p. 76), contains estimates of interpersonal and
intrapersonal redistribution in Denmark, based on the synthetic life cycles described in
section 2.1. All numbers in the table are average payments accumulated over the life
cycle, accounting for observed diﬀerences in life expectancies across income groups. To
put the numbers in the subsequent rows in perspective, the first row shows the average
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lifetime factor income in the various deciles. The second row from the bottom of Table
5 shows the average net transfer received by those who end up with positive net receipts
from the government over their life cycles (those for whom Ni > 0). In the bottom row,
we report the average net taxes paid by those who end up paying more to the government
than they receive (Ni ≤ 0). Not surprisingly, most of the net recipients are concentrated
in the lower lifetime income groups, while most of the net tax payments are concentrated
in the top income groups, reflecting our earlier finding that some amount of redistribution
from rich to poor does after all take place.
The first ten columns in Table 5 contain average accumulated lifetime payments/receipts
for each of the ten income deciles. The final column reports averages across the entire
population. Adding the figures in the fourth and fifth rows in the final column and divid-
ing the sum by the figure in the second row of that same column, we find that 74 percent
of the taxes levied to finance social insurance represent intrapersonal redistribution over
the taxpayer’s own life cycle, leaving only 26 percent of tax revenues for interpersonal
redistribution from high- to low lifetime incomes. Moreover, it is striking that even at the
bottom of the income distribution some people are net taxpayers on a lifetime basis, while
at the top of the distribution some people receive net benefits over their life course. Pre-
sumably, an optimal tax-transfer system seeking to redistribute lifetime incomes would
limit such cases.
(Table 5 about here)
The estimates in Table 5 assume that indirect as well as direct taxes contribute pro-
portionally to the financing of social-insurance benefits. Since indirect taxes are typically
levied for revenue purposes rather than to equalize the distribution of income, one might
alternatively assume that social-insurance benefits are financed only out of direct taxes.
Adopting this alternative assumption, Hansen (2005) finds that about 29 percent of
social-insurance transfers serve to redistribute lifetime incomes in Denmark, compared to
26 percent when the financing includes indirect as well as direct taxes. The conclusion
thus remains that by far the greatest part of redistribution is intrapersonal rather than
interpersonal.
Assuming that both indirect and direct taxes contributed pari passu to the financing
of social insurance, Hussénius and Selén (1994) employed the method described above
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to estimate that only about 21 percent of the taxes levied to finance social insurance
in Sweden accomplishes interpersonal redistribution. Their study was based on a much
smaller panel data set covering only two calendar years. This necessitated the matching
of a large number of individuals to construct synthetic life cycles. Since the statistical
matching tends to reduce the recorded variation in lifetime incomes, the Swedish study
may have underestimated the amount of interpersonal redistribution via the tax-transfer
system.8 Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) recently updated and refined the estimates
by Hussénius and Selén (op.cit.), estimating lifetime incomes with the aid of a dynamic
micro-simulation model and including the value of important public services such as
education, health care and care for the elderly in a comprehensive measure of lifetime in-
come. With this extended concept of income, Pettersson and Pettersson found that only
18 percent of the taxes levied to finance social-insurance transfers and social services
in Sweden can be categorized as interpersonal redistribution. Falkingham and Harding
(1996) found a degree of interpersonal redistribution between 48 and 62 percent in Aus-
tralia and between 29 and 38 percent in Great Britain, depending on the extent to which
indirect taxes are assumed to contribute to the financing of social transfers. For Ireland
and Italy, O’Donoghue (2001) estimated a degree of interpersonal redistribution of 45
percent and 24 percent, respectively, using the same assumption on indirect tax finance
as the one employed in the present study and in the Swedish studies mentioned above.
These empirical findings suggest that the contribution of taxes and transfers to in-
terpersonal redistribution is smaller in the Scandinavian countries than elsewhere. At
least two factors may help to explain this diﬀerence, the first one being purely technical:
in Scandinavia practically all social-insurance benefits are included in taxable income,
whereas in other countries benefits are often tax-free (and correspondingly lower). The
taxable status of benefits in Scandinavia automatically means that a relatively high frac-
tion of social transfers will be financed by taxes paid by the benefit recipients themselves
8When individuals from two diﬀerent cohorts need to be matched, some individuals from the smaller
cohort are allowed to enter into more than one match in order to avoid the loss of too many observations.
The fact that the same individuals are included in more than one synthetic life cycle tends to reduce
the heterogeneity (and hence the dispersion of income) across individuals in the constructed life cycles.
Compared to the study by Hussénius and Selén, this problem is smaller in the Danish study presented
here where much fewer matches were required to generate a synthetic life cycle.
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and will hence be categorized as intrapersonal redistribution. A second reason why the
Scandinavian countries stand out may be that they tend to oﬀer more universal bene-
fits essentially covering the entire population, whereas social-insurance programs in the
Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be more targeted towards the poor and to rely more on
means-testing (see Lindbeck (2006)). Broader coverage of social transfer programs means
that more taxpayers end up receiving substantial public transfers over their life course.
Still, the evidence indicates that even outside the Nordic area the benefits provided by
the modern welfare state are to a large extent smoothing consumption across individuals’
life courses rather than promoting equality in lifetime incomes or providing insurance
against adverse shocks to lifetime incomes.
3. The theoretical rationale for social insurance based on indi-
vidual savings accounts
As an alternative or supplement to tax-financed transfers, the consumption-smoothing
function of the welfare state can be accomplished also through saving schemes that link
taxes and benefits on an individual level. In such a scheme workers contribute a fraction
of their earnings to an individual saving account that is debited when the owner draws
social-insurance benefits. At the time of retirement, any surplus on the account is used
to supplement retirement benefits. By linking benefits to contributions in an actuarially
fair way, the saving accounts reduce the tax wedge on labour income. Social security
contributions essentially become benefit taxes.9
With well-functioning capital markets, rational forward-looking behavior and no re-
distributional concerns, the government can rely on voluntary saving to accomplish con-
sumption smoothing over the life course. Compulsory saving accounts can help address
imperfect capital markets giving rise to liquidity constraints, just as they may help to
address policy concerns regarding lifetime redistribution, lack of self control, and moral
hazard in insurance. We explore these possible functions of compulsory saving accounts
in turn.
9To the extent that existing social-security contributions finance wage-linked benefits, they are in fact
already, at least in part, benefit taxes.
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3.1. Liquidity insurance
Compulsory individual accounts protect people by allowing individuals to make with-
drawals from the accounts even if the account balance is negative. In this way, the
government in eﬀect provides liquidity insurance and alleviates capital-market imperfec-
tions. The future compulsory contributions into the saving scheme act as collateral so
that the government can provide credit. The relief of liquidity constraints is especially
important for the lower middle class workers, who often face borrowing constraints that
prevent them from smoothing consumption over time in the face of various shocks. By
allowing workers to in fact access the capital market and thus decouple individual annual
consumption levels from individual annual incomes, compulsory saving accounts make
lifetime income rather than annual income a more important indicator of welfare.
In the context of a model with involuntary unemployment, Section A.2 in the appen-
dix shows that compulsory saving accounts can oﬀer more eﬃcient liquidity insurance
than tax-financed unemployment benefits do. Intuitively, by linking contributions more
closely to actual benefits received, compulsory saving accounts contain the adverse in-
centive eﬀects of providing liquidity insurance. Moreover, in contrast to a simple cut in
unemployment benefits, the introduction of mandatory unemployment accounts and the
associated liquidity insurance allows the individual to bear the risk of unemployment in
a period of life when consumption is higher. Whereas a cut in unemployment benefits
would force a cut in consumption when it is already low (assuming that the unemployed
are liquidity-constrained and that benefits are lower than wages), achieving the same
improvement of the public budget through mandatory contributions to individual unem-
ployment accounts would allow workers to concentrate the cut in consumption in periods
when they are employed and feature lower marginal utility of consumption.
3.2. Lifetime redistribution
In the presence of individual accounts, the government can protect the lifetime poor
by bailing out individuals who end up with a negative account balance at the end of
their working lives. In this way, the government redistributes to the lifetime poor and
provides insurance against catastrophic shocks that substantially harm lifetime incomes.
Redistribution is thus targeted more closely at the lifetime poor who are suﬀering a
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combination of low wage incomes and frequent adverse shocks during their lives. The
individual saving accounts essentially help to keep track of which individuals fare poorly
in life. By thus in eﬀect collecting information on who is lifetime poor, the individual
accounts improve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ if the government uses this information
to oﬀer a lifetime income guarantee (in the sense of bailing out individuals who end up
with a negative account balance). The government thus focuses its scarce resources on
redistribution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor — rather than making politically
expedient transfers among various important groups of voters with comparable long-run
living standards. Indeed, by cutting out the transfers that merely redistribute resources
over the life course and focussing the transfers on interpersonal redistribution to the
lifetime poor, the government can reduce distortionary tax wedges on labor supply.
In the context of a model with three types of households, Section A.2 of the appendix
shows how individual saving accounts can improve the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ by using
information on lifetime incomes. The additional information on lifetime incomes essen-
tially allows the government to implement an optimal non-linear lifetime income tax. In
particular, individual accounts establish an eﬃciency-enhancing actuarial link between
contributions and benefits for high-income and middle-income workers — who currently
pay distortionary taxes partly to finance distortionary social benefits to themselves —
without reducing net transfers paid to the low-income workers who remain protected by
the lifetime income guarantee. In other words, the saving accounts eﬀectively enable
the government to implement selective cuts in tax-financed benefits for high-income and
middle-income groups without having to reduce these benefits at the bottom of the in-
come ladder. By at the same time providing liquidity insurance, the government increases
the importance of lifetime income rather than annual income as an indicator for overall
welfare.
Individual accounts do not improve labour-market incentives for the lifetime poor.
Indeed, the individual account system can be viewed as a way to implement low marginal
tax rates at the top of the lifetime income distribution (see the model in section A.2 of the
appendix). At the bottom of the lifetime income distribution, however, high marginal tax
rates remain the inescapable price of redistribution. The government can rely on financial
incentives to stimulate the middle class, which accounts for a large share of eﬀective
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labour input in the economy. However, the government must use other instruments to
activate the lifetime poor, whose employment is important for maintaining social cohesion
in a society. Among other things, the government can focus its active labour-market
policies and its administrative resources on this group. In particular, the government
may collect additional information by closely monitoring job search and health conditions.
The government provides benefits on the condition that an able individual gives up leisure
time to improve skills or (look for) work. In this connection, workfare may play a useful
role; the mere threat of being put on workfare is likely to boost work incentives.
Individual accounts are particularly attractive if the distribution of life-course incomes
is not very skewed compared to the distribution of annual incomes. In that case, annual
income is typically not a good indicator for lifetime income; information on lifetime in-
come can thus make lifetime redistribution more eﬃcient. In the modern life cycle with
many working women and long periods of full-time or part-time education, a substantial
number of workers move between periods of full-time work to periods of voluntary (some-
times part-time) absence from the labor market to educate themselves, start of business,
or care for children and/or frail relatives (see e.g. Bovenberg (2005)). This makes annual
income a poor indicator of lifetime income.
With little lifetime inequality, redistribution of lifetime incomes does not have to be
costly. Indeed, in that case, the government does not need to bail out many households
with negative account balances. Intuitively, over their life cycles, a large middle class is
able to finance its own benefits. This points to the importance of providing individuals
with equal opportunities in the beginning of their working lives in the form of good start
qualifications provided by basic education. The less polarized a society is in terms of
human capital, the less the fiscal system has to redistribute resources from high lifetime-
income earners to low lifetime-income earners and the more the government can limit
itself to helping individuals smooth their consumption over the life cycle.
3.3. Mandatory saving and myopia
The individual accounts do not escape the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency to the
extent that lifetime incomes are distributed unequally. Liquidity insurance also implies
some costs. Lifetime redistribution as well as liquidity and lifetime income insurance
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give rise to moral hazard; agents have an incentive to minimize their contributions and
maximize their withdrawals. The government must therefore regulate withdrawals so
that they can be made only for pre-specified purposes. Savings must also be mandatory
— at least until a specific upper limit is reached.
In addition to moral hazard, lack of self control and myopia are other reasons for
making saving mandatory. Compulsory saving accounts in eﬀect extend mandatory sav-
ing aimed at retirement to precautionary saving aimed at social insurance for individuals
of working age. By being paternalistic, the government helps individuals who lack self
control to implement better consumption smoothing. However, if individuals lack the
willpower or cognitive abilities to smooth consumption over their lifetimes, annual dis-
posable income becomes relatively more important than lifetime income as a welfare
indicator. Accordingly, the government should base its redistributive policies not only
on lifetime incomes (and the associated balances in individual accounts), but also on
disposable incomes at each point in time. Intuitively, the government cannot rely on
individuals to allocate their lifetime incomes optimally over their life course, and must
therefore be concerned also about the distribution of annual incomes.
A disadvantage of mandatory saving is that the government may force some people
to save too much. This can be an important drawback if preferences are heterogeneous
and people cannot undo mandatory saving by borrowing. In that case, tax incentives,
which respect free choice, can complement limited mandatory saving as an instrument to
stimulate individuals to save. Tax incentives, however, typically imply a large deadweight
loss as individuals who would have saved even in the absence of tax incentives take
advantage of the tax privileges by simply restructuring their portfolio. To prevent this,
the government can target tax subsidies at agents with low financial and human wealth
by limiting tax incentives to low levels of saving.
3.4. Moral hazard and optimal lifetime insurance
Another reason why saving schemes may enhance eﬃciency is moral hazard in insuring
human-capital shocks over the life cycle. In particular, agents may be able to aﬀect the
probability that the insured contingency occurs. To illustrate, unemployment compen-
sation can harm incentives to find work and remain employable. Another form of moral
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hazard is benefit cheating, which can occur if the insured conditions are diﬃcult to verify.
Individuals may, for example, pretend to be sick or disabled in order to claim sickness
or disability benefits. Moral hazard is a problem even for actuarially neutral insurances
that charge a premium that is directly related to the expected individual benefit from
the insurance.10
Various developments increase the dangers of moral hazard and hence make human-
capital risks less insurable. As the economy shifts from blue-collar work in industrial
sectors to white-collar work in service sectors and knowledge-intensive activities, mental
causes of sickness and disability become more prominent. These types of sickness and
disability can be less easily verified than physical disabilities. Moreover, an increasing
number of workers now moves between periods of full-time work to periods of voluntary
absence from the labor market to enjoy leisure, educate themselves, set up a business,
or care for children or frail relatives. In such a transitional labor market, it becomes
more diﬃcult to separate voluntary periods of inactivity from involuntary unemployment.
At the same time, individuals can increasingly aﬀect the probability that they become
unemployed by investing in their own employability. In other words, the dividing line
between the contingencies that people are responsible for and these that they are not
becomes less clear. These changes in the nature of social risks make it more costly to
insure human capital in terms of harming the incentives to accumulate and maintain that
capital. At the same time, a more dynamic world economy and a decline of the extended
family as an insurance device have increased the demand for such insurance as people
experience more substantial economic insecurity.
Moral hazard gives rise to a fundamental conflict between facilitating insurance and
providing incentives to reduce the probability that the insured risk occurs. In particular,
reducing the extent of insurance through the introduction of deductibles can combat
moral hazard. Deductibles help internalize the social costs of benefit payments, thereby
discouraging individuals from making excessive claims on the welfare state. At the same
time, however, these deductibles impose costs on a risk-averse individual by reducing
insurance through risk pooling. Another way to combat moral hazard is to monitor
10Whereas the premia of such insurances do not distort the labor market, the benefits harm labor-
market incentives if people can aﬀect the probability that they are eligible for these benefits by changing
their labor-market behavior.
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agents and to regulate their behavior, but this may well be costly in terms of intrusion
in private lives.
Individual saving accounts can improve the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives
by facilitating self-insurance over the life course. In particular, these accounts increase
the scope for deductibles without compromising minimum consumption standards of
individuals who are hit by temporary adverse shocks. They do so by allowing individuals
who suﬀer from liquidity constraints when they are hit by an adverse shock to shift the
payment of deductibles to the periods in which they can more easily aﬀord these costs.
Individuals can thus self-insure themselves over their life course, and do not have to rely
on insurance that gives rise to moral hazard. Risks can be self-insured on a lifetime basis,
and thus do not have be insured on a day-to-day basis. Indeed, risks that may seem large
on an annual basis may in fact be quite small when considered over an entire lifetime. To
illustrate, two unemployment spells of half a year reduce lifetime incomes of an individual
with a full-time working career of thirty years by only about 3 %.
The potential of individual accounts in improving the trade-oﬀ between insurance and
incentives depends crucially on the extent to which individuals face correlated shocks
during their lifetimes. The potential welfare gains of individual saving accounts are large
if various income shocks are uncorrelated across time and among each other. In that case,
annual incomes are poor indicators of lifetime incomes, and income shocks are in fact only
small in the context of an entire lifetime. There is thus ample scope for self-insurance
by pooling risks facing a single individual. If shocks are strongly positively correlated, in
contrast, risks do not become much smaller in a lifetime context (compared to an annual
context). In particular, some individuals are always unlucky and therefore remain poor,
while others seem to continuously strike it rich. Risks then remain catastrophic, even
when viewed over the entire life course. Self-insurance is then costly, and pooling risks
across individuals (rather than just intertemporally for each single individual) through
insurance creates substantial value. Also the scarring eﬀect of unemployment on human
capital makes insurance more valuable. More generally, labor-market risks tend to be
correlated in the presence of dual labour markets in which insiders enjoy high incomes
throughout their lives while outsiders must make do with insecure jobs and tend to suﬀer
from frequent and long-lasting unemployment. Hence, long unemployment durations in
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slow-moving labor markets make individual accounts less attractive as an instrument to
provide lifetime income insurance.
For each type of human capital risk, another combination between insurance and
self-insurance through saving is optimal, depending on the magnitude of the risk in
terms of the potential drop in lifetime income and the potential danger of moral hazard
because of endogeneity and non-verifiability of the insured risk. Self-insurance should
be relatively important for non-catastrophic risks that people can aﬀect through non-
verifiable actions, such as short-term unemployment and the first sickness days. Stiglitz
and Yun (2002) explore the optimal mix of self-insurance through saving accounts and
tax-financed insurance. They show that self-insurance should play a more prominent role
if risk aversion is low, moral hazard is important, various risks are uncorrelated across
time and among each other, and these risks are only small in a lifetime perspective. They
also demonstrate that the optimal extent of self-insurance depends on the history of an
individual. Self-insurance should optimally be the most important for those individuals
who have not experienced adverse shocks early in life so that they are not likely to end
up being lifetime poor. Also here, the conclusion is thus that saving schemes can play
a more important role in providing incentives for the middle- and higher incomes than
for the lifetime poor. The optimal mix between saving and insurance may also vary
between workers in diﬀerent sectors in the economy. This provides an argument for
a role for social partners on a sectoral level in determining the optimal mixes between
saving and insurance. Indeed, individual saving schemes may be incorporated in collective
sectoral agreements. These agreements may provide for mandatory contributions into
both specific employee insurances with deductibles and individual saving schemes from
which individuals can draw to pay deductibles.
Bovenberg and Sørensen (2006) investigate the optimal structure of lifetime income
taxation and social insurance aimed at both lifetime income redistribution and disability
insurance, which can be interpreted as insurance against all kinds of idiosyncratic shocks
to human capital. They show that even in the absence of moral hazard full insurance
against these idiosyncratic shocks is not optimal. The reason is that imperfect insurance
encourages workers to self-insure themselves by raising their labour supply, thereby alle-
viating the distortionary impact of redistributive labour taxation. Hence, a tension exists
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between lifetime redistribution and insurance against human-capital shocks. By harm-
ing labour supply, social insurance imposes a negative externality on the redistributive
branch of the government. The greater the weight attached to redistribution towards
the lifetime poor with low skills, the less the government can allow the higher skilled to
insure themselves fully against disability risk. This result suggests that the government
cannot leave individuals completely free to use their social security contributions to buy
actuarially fair insurances. Against this risk of overinsurance, however, stands the risk of
underinsurance due to selection giving rise to excessive transaction costs. In any case, a
hybrid system of insurance and self-insurance would typically be optimal, depending on
moral hazard, selection, risk aversion and redistributive preferences and the associated
distortionary taxes.
3.5. Extensions
In outlining the case for individual saving accounts, we have focussed on insuring shocks
aﬀecting the earning capabilities of individuals. Similar arguments for and against sav-
ing schemes apply to the financing of health care. In particular, saving schemes can be
part of a three-pillar model in health-care financing involving a hybrid system of saving,
insurance and redistribution. In particular, this model involves, first, government assis-
tance for those who cannot aﬀord a minimum level of medical care (i.e. redistribution);
second, medical insurance for catastrophic events supplemented by limited insurance for
other events (i.e. insurance based on risk pooling); third, compulsory individual medical
saving for financing deductibles and coinsurances (i.e. consumption smoothing and self
insurance). The optimal mix between these three pillars depends on the particular type
of health-care cost considered. As explained above for social insurance, saving schemes
are most attractive for costs that are distributed rather uniformly across individuals (seen
over the life cycle as a whole).
The principle of individual saving accounts can be applied to finance user fees for not
only medical care but also other services, such as higher education and child care. If indi-
viduals pay these costs from their individual saving accounts and can thus smooth these
costs over their entire lifetime, the government can rely more on consumer sovereignty for
selecting the level, quality and nature of the service, and thus does not have to impose
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strict regulations (e.g. by rationing individuals).
4. Individual accounts in a Western European welfare state: how
would they work?
Having laid out the theoretical rationale for social insurance based on individual accounts
combined with a lifetime income guarantee, we will now discuss in more detail how
individual accounts (IAs) might be designed in practice, and how they are likely to
aﬀect income distribution, economic eﬃciency and the public finances. For the sake of
concreteness, we consider the proposal of the Danish Economic Council (2005, ch. VI)
for a system of individual accounts in Denmark. Section 4.1 describes the proposal and
discusses some policy choices involved in its design. Section 4.2 estimates the eﬀects of
the proposed IA system on the distribution of lifetime incomes, and Section 4.3 explores
its likely eﬀects on the labour market, the public budget and economic eﬃciency. Section
4.4 compares our proposal to other recent proposals for an IA system.
4.1. A reform proposal for Denmark
As documented in section 2.3, there is a large element of intrapersonal redistribution
in the current Danish welfare state arrangements. Against this background, the Danish
Economic Council (2005, ch. VI) proposed that part of the existing social-insurance
benefits should be financed via mandatory individual savings accounts. The purpose
of the reform proposal (henceforth the DEC proposal) was to reduce the distortionary
impact of the tax-transfer system while preserving the liquidity insurance and lifetime
income insurance oﬀered by the present system. To understand the context for the DEC
proposal, note that in Denmark the bulk of social-insurance benefits is financed out of
general tax revenues, and most benefits are paid out in flat rates that are unrelated to
previous wage incomes. The link between benefits and labour supply is thus very weak
in the current Danish system of social insurance. This implies that saving accounts can
not only combat moral hazard in social insurance but also reduce the implicit tax wedge
on labor supply due to a weak link between contributions and expected benefits.
According to the DEC proposal, the IA system would have the following features.
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Each citizen in the age group from 18 years until the oﬃcial retirement age of 65 years
would be required to deposit a certain percentage of his/her labour income in an in-
dividual account every year. For employees, this social security contribution would be
calculated as a percentage of gross wage income. For the self-employed, it would be cal-
culated on the basis of the imputed labour income, which is computed every year as an
integral part of the Danish tax code. Whenever a person receives certain social-insurance
benefits according to the current eligibility rules (which are assumed to be unchanged),
his/her individual account would be debited by the corresponding amount, and the bal-
ance on the IA would be carried forward with the interest rate on short-term government
bonds. If the IA balance is positive at the time of retirement, the account holder may
choose to have it converted into an annuity that is added to the ordinary public retire-
ment benefit, or he/she may choose to have the balance paid out as a lump sum.11 If
the IA balance is negative when the individual reaches the oﬃcial retirement age, the
account is simply set to zero. Accordingly, the owner of the account still receives the
ordinary flat retirement benefit as a consequence of the lifetime income insurance built
into the system. For married couples, any benefit paid to one of the spouses is debited by
half the amount on the IA of each spouse, and for unmarried parents any child-related
benefits are likewise debited by half the amount on the IA of each parent. These rules
are intended to ensure a reasonably equal distribution of IA balances between men and
women.
When selecting the transfer programs to be included in the IA system, the DEC fo-
cused on those programs that involve the lowest degree of interpersonal redistribution in
order to minimize the potential negative impacts on lifetime income distribution. Specif-
ically, the DEC proposed inclusion of the following transfers in the IA system:
1. Early retirement benefits
2. Education benefits
3. Short-term unemployment benefits
11When IA balances are converted into annuities, policymakers may choose to diﬀerentiate the con-
version factors across diﬀerent groups to reflect diﬀerences in expected lifetimes. As a technical matter,
the calculations presented in sections 4.2 and 4.3 assume that all positive IA balances are paid out as
lump sums at the time of retirement.
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(for unemployment spells up to a length of three months)
4. Sickness benefits (up to a limited number of sickness days)
5. Child benefits
6. Parental leave benefits
Table 4 shows that early retirement benefits, education benefits, parental leave bene-
fits and child benefits imply a low degree of lifetime income redistribution, serving mainly
to redistribute resources across the taxpayer’s own life cycle. The same goes for ordinary
retirement benefits, but this transfer program was not included in the proposed IA system
in view of the ongoing discussion in Denmark about the need for a separate reform of
the pension system in the light of population aging. Programs such as social assistance,
disability benefits and housing benefits were excluded from the IA system since they in-
volve a high degree of interpersonal redistribution, as indicated in Table 4. Furthermore,
according to estimates by Hansen (2005, p. 86), the degree of lifetime income redistrib-
ution implied by benefits paid to workers suﬀering long unemployment spells (exceeding
three months) is almost twice as large as the interpersonal redistribution generated by
short-term unemployment benefits (for spells shorter than three months). For this rea-
son the DEC proposal includes only short-term unemployment benefits in the IA system.
Similarly, there is a presumption that benefits paid during long sickness spells are more
redistributive than those paid during short spells. Moreover, short-term sickness spells
tend to involve a greater moral hazard problem of verifiability. The DEC therefore pro-
posed that only benefits paid during a limited number of sickness days should be included
in the IA system. However, data limitations compelled us to include all sickness benefits
in the calculations presented below.
The total spending on the transfer programs included in the proposed IA system
amounts to 7.9 percent of the base for the proportional Danish payroll tax (’arbejds-
markedsbidrag’). This tax is levied on gross wage income and on the imputed labour
income of the self-employed (with no ceiling for any of these groups); for wage earners,
the tax is collected at the employee level. The DEC therefore proposed that the payroll
tax be cut by 7.9 percentage points and be replaced by a corresponding mandatory con-
tribution to the taxpayer’s individual account. This IA contribution would be deductible
against the base for the personal income tax, as is the case for the current payroll tax. For
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symmetry reasons, the positive balance on the IA would then be included in the personal
income tax base when it is paid out. For individuals who end up with a negative IA
balance, the deductibility of contributions is likewise oﬀset by the fact that the benefits
included in the IA system are all subject to income tax in the year they are paid out.
The account system could be administered directly by the government, or it could be
administered by private sector financial institutions. In Denmark, all taxpayers below 65
years of age already contribute to a mandatory supplementary pension scheme (denoted
ATP), so it would seem natural to build on this existing administrative infrastructure.
The IA system would be phased in gradually. All citizens in the age group between 18
years and the oﬃcial retirement age (currently 65 years) could start participating imme-
diately. In the first few years, people reaching the retirement age would have accumulated
relatively small balances. As time elapses and new retirees would have participated in the
IA system for a longer time, balances would grow, but at the same time the labour-supply
eﬀects discussed below would exert a growing positive influence on net public revenue.
The system is thus automatically phased in gradually, with no need for special transition
rules.
4.2. Eﬀects on income distribution
Table 6 shows the estimated distributional impact of the proposed IA system, assuming
a zero growth-adjusted real interest rate. The estimate was produced by Hansen (2005)
using the data and the constructed synthetic life cycles described in section 2.1. Impor-
tantly, the table abstracts from any behavioral eﬀect of the IA system. The numbers
thus reflect only the mechanical impact eﬀect. Although the very purpose of the IA
system is to influence labour-market behavior, the distribution of positive IA balances in
Table 6 should provide a good proxy for the eﬀect of the reform on the distribution of
individual welfare. The reason is that, by the Envelope Theorem, changes in employment
caused by the IA system yield no first-order eﬀects on individual welfare if individuals
have optimized their behavior in the initial equilibrium and are not rationed on the labor
market.
(Table 6 about here)
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The second row in Table 6 shows the accumulated contributions to the IA relative
to the accumulated withdrawals from the account for each of the deciles in the lifetime
income distribution. Not surprisingly, this ratio is systematically rising with lifetime
income. Moreover, the ratio of the average positive IA balance to lifetime income is also
rising with the income level, as shown in the third row in Table 6. Furthermore, whereas
only 7.2 percent of individuals in the lowest decile end up with a positive IA balance at
the time of retirement (assuming unchanged behavior), almost 80 percent of people in
the top decile will accumulate a positive balance, as indicated in the fourth row of the
table.
This distributional pattern reflects the fact that the contributions to the IA are pro-
portional to labour income whereas most of the benefits included in the IA system are
paid out in flat rates. It also reflects the fact that people who are less active in the
labour market and more dependent on the transfer system tend to end up in the lower
lifetime income brackets. There is thus no doubt that the proposed IA system will make
the lifetime income distribution more unequal. The distributional impact will be limited,
however. Specifically, while the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of disposable lifetime
income is 0.127 under the current Danish tax-transfer system (see Table 1), it would
only rise to 0.133 if the proposed IA system were introduced. Table 1 reveals that the
Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of lifetime factor income is currently 0.253. While
the redistribution of lifetime income implied by the current tax-transfer system amounts
to (0.253-0.127)/0.253 = 49.8 percent, the redistribution under the DEC proposal would
thus still amount to a substantial (0.253-0.133)/0.253 = 47.4 percent.12 Moreover, as we
shall argue in the next section, the proposed IA system would generate a Pareto improve-
ment even under rather conservative assumptions regarding behavioral responses.
4.3. Eﬀects on the public budget and economic eﬃciency
Although the rate of contribution to the IAs is chosen so that total contributions corre-
spond to total spending on the relevant transfers, part of the contributions are channeled
back to the contributors in the form of positive IA balances. In the absence of any be-
12These mechanical calculations are based on the heroic assumption that factor incomes are unaﬀected
by the tax-transfer system.
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havioral changes, the positive IA balances recorded in the third row of Table 6 would
thus imply a corresponding deficit on the public budget.
However, the IA reform is bound to aﬀect labour supply through several channels.
First, the reform implies a cut in the eﬀective marginal tax rate on labour income for
all those who can look forward to a positive IA balance. The reason is that a marginal
contribution to the IA, which replaces the payroll tax, is returned to the taxpayer himself
at the time of retirement (with interest added). The lower marginal tax rate should
stimulate labour supply at the intensive margin, inducing people to work more hours.
Second, by cutting the payroll tax, the reform also reduces the average eﬀective tax rate
on labour income, thus increasing the income gain experienced by a person who moves
from non-employment into employment. This will boost labour supply at the extensive
margin, thus increasing the rate of employment. Third, in the transfer programs included
in the IA reform, the eﬀective benefit rates will be reduced to zero, since an increased
take-up of benefits is matched by a corresponding reduction of future retirement benefits
(in present-value terms) for individuals with positive IA balances. This drop in the
eﬀective replacement rate in the relevant transfer programs also stimulates labour supply
at the extensive margin.
An ideal tool for the evaluation of these behavioral responses would be a disaggregated
econometrically estimated computable general equilibriummodel. However, since no such
model is yet available for the Danish economy, we resort to some aggregate back-of-the-
envelope calculations. Section A.1 of the appendix shows that, if the growth-adjusted
real interest rate is zero and income eﬀects on labour supply are negligible, the eﬀect of
the IA reform on the public budget is given by
dR
ewh
=
mechanical eﬀect on revenuez }| {
dτ + c
µ
1− e
e
¶
dα −
revenue change due to labour-supply responsez }| {
ε
µ
τ
1− τ
¶
dτ − η
µ
t+ c
1− t− c
¶
dt+ cη
µ
t+ c
1− t− c
¶
dα,
(4.1)
ε ≡ dh/h
dw (1− τ) /w (1− τ) , η ≡
de/e
dy/y
,
where dR/ewh is the present value of the change in the budget balance relative to the
labour income tax base for individuals with positive IA balances, τ is the total marginal
eﬀective tax rate on labour income (including indirect taxes), c is the average replace-
ment rate in the transfer programs included in the IA system (measured as the after-tax
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benefit rate relative to the average pre-tax income of a full-time worker), e is the rate of
employment (the participation rate), t is the total average eﬀective tax rate on labour
income (including indirect taxes), h is the number of hours worked by the average worker,
w is his pre-tax real wage rate, ε is the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the
marginal after-tax wage rate, y is the gain in real disposable income when moving from
non-employment into employment, η is the elasticity of labour force participation with
respect to y, and α is the fraction of the total transfers received by the average worker
that is debited to his individual account.13
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (4.1) represent the ’mechanical’ eﬀect
on revenue in the absence of any behavioral changes, while the last three terms capture
the improvement of the budget generated by the labour-supply responses to the reform.
Note that since α is zero before the reform, and since the reform involves a cut in the
eﬀective marginal and average labour income tax rate, we have dα > 0, dτ < 0 and
dt < 0. Hence, all of the last three terms in (4.1) contribute to an improvement of the
public budget on the assumption that the elasticities ε and η are positive. The budgetary
eﬀects of the IA reform arise only from its impact on the group that ends up with positive
IA balances. According to the bottom row in Table 6, a lower-bound estimate of the size
of this group is that it will include about 46 percent of all taxpayers. However, Table
6 abstracts from behavioral changes. In practice, these changes enable some taxpayers
who would otherwise have ended up with a small IA deficit to accumulate a surplus. The
Danish Economic Council (2005, ch. VI) therefore estimates that about 60 percent of all
taxpayers will end up with a positive IA balance. The remaining 40 percent of taxpayers
with negative balances are treated exactly as under the current tax-transfer system. This
group may therefore be neglected when evaluating the budgetary eﬀects of the reform.
Since the cut in τ depends on the amount of benefits that are financed via the IAs,
there is a systematic link between the magnitudes dτ and dα in (4.1). Specifically, section
A.1 of the appendix shows that
dα = −
µ
ewh
b (1− e)
¶µ
dτ +
A
ewh
¶
, (4.2)
where b is the average after-tax benefit rate in the transfer programs included in the
13With negligible income eﬀects, the elasticities ε and η reflect compensated as well as uncompensated
elasticities.
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IA system, A is the average IA balance for those with a positive balance at retirement
(assuming unchanged behavior), and ewh is the average lifetime labour income in the
group of taxpayers with a positive IA balance (also assuming unchanged behavior). Given
the parameter values reported in section A.1 of the appendix, plausible parameters in a
Danish context would be
ewh
b (1− e) = 20.39,
A
ewh
= 0.016. (4.3)
In the DEC proposal, the payroll tax rate is cut by 7.9 percentage points, but since
the payroll tax is deducted from the income tax base, the fall in the eﬀective marginal
direct tax rate on labour income is only about half this amount, given the estimate by
the Danish Ministry of Finance (2004) that the marginal income tax rate for the average
Danish taxpayer is about 50 percent. Further, using formula (A.8) in the appendix, we
find that a fall in the eﬀective marginal direct tax rate of about 4 percentage points
translates into the following drop in the total eﬀective marginal tax rate (which includes
indirect taxes): dτ = −0.029. Substituting this along with (4.3) into (4.2), we get
dα = 0.263. The interpretation of this number is that on average about 26 percent of
total transfers are debited to the IAs, reflecting the fact that the IA system applies only
to a subset of social-insurance programs (where 100 percent of benefits are debited to the
IAs).
According to section A.1 of the appendix, we initially have (roughly)
t = 0.54, τ = 0.63, c = 0.23 (4.4)
for the average Danish worker. Moreover, formula (A.8) in the appendix implies that
dt = dτ = −0.029. To be able to apply formula (4.1), we now need only to calibrate
the labour supply elasticities. Although estimates of the average (uncompensated) wage
elasticity of hours worked for Denmark tend to centre around 0.1 (a little higher for
females and a little lower for males), we select ε = 0.05 to be on the safe side. The
participation elasticity η was recently estimated by Le Maire and Scheuer (2005) to be in
the range 0.2-0.4 for Danish recipients of social assistance benefits. However, the authors
argue that these estimates may have an upward bias, so to remain conservative we set
η = 0.1. This relatively low estimate partly reflects the eﬀectiveness of Danish active
labor-market policies in encouraging transfer recipients to find work.
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Armed with all these parameters, and noting that c (1− e) /e ≡ b (1− e) /ewh =
1/8.5 = 0.118, we now find from (4.1) that
dR
ewh
=
mechanical
eﬀect on
revenuez }| {
−0.016 +
revenue eﬀect of
hours-of-work
responsez }| {
0.002 +
revenue eﬀect of
participation response
to lower taxesz}|{
0.01 +
revenue eﬀect of
participation response
to lower net benefitsz}|{
0.02 = 0.016. (4.5)
Despite our rather conservative labour supply elasticities, the IA reform would im-
prove the public budget by about one and a half percent of the labour-income tax base for
the individuals whose incentives are positively aﬀected. Indeed, we see that the labour-
supply response to the cut in the marginal and average eﬀective labour-income tax rates
would in itself enable the government to recoup (0.002 + 0.01) /0.016 = 75 percent of the
initial revenue loss from the reform.14 (4.5) shows that a substantial part of the positive
impact on public revenue stems from the participation response to the cut in eﬀective
benefit rates implied by the IA system. On reflection, this is not surprising, given that
the IAs eﬀectively reduce the replacement rates in the relevant transfer programs from
around 50 percent to zero, and that the eﬀective tax wedge on the participation margin¡
t+c
1−t−c
¢
= 3.34 is quite large.
If workers were allowed to use their accounts to buy actuarially fair insurance from
private insurance companies (for example involving sickness or disability insurance), the
actuarial link between contributions and expected benefits would reduce tax distortions
compared to the present system of social insurance, but eﬀective benefit rates would re-
main constant. Accordingly, the behavioral responses would be limited to those stemming
from cuts in marginal and average tax rates.
The finding in (4.5) implies that the IA reform would be a genuine Pareto improve-
ment. The reform raises the welfare of all agents who end up with positive IA balances
(and thus enjoy higher retirement benefits), generates a bit of additional revenue for the
government, and leaves the agents who end up with negative IA balances unaﬀected.
14The initial revenue loss from the reform consists of a loss of 2.9 percent of the tax base due to the
tax cut, and a revenue gain of 1.3 percent of the tax base due to the cut in the eﬀective benefit rates.
The labour supply response to the lower marginal and average tax rates thus allows the government to
recoup 0.012/0.029 ≈ 41 percent of the revenue loss from the tax cut. By way of comparison, using a
computable general equilibrium model, the Danish Economic Council (2004, p. 94) estimated that about
56 percent of the initial revenue loss from a cut in the payroll tax rate would be recouped via increased
economic activity. Our estimate is thus slightly more pessimistic than that of the DEC.
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The Danish Economic Council (2005, ch. VI) reaches a similar conclusion. It likewise
estimates that the reform would slightly improve the government budget, using a some-
what diﬀerent method of calculation. Furthermore, the result that the introduction of
IAs would imply a Pareto improvement is in line with the theoretical analysis in section
A.2 of the appendix.
One may still wonder whether the result reported in (4.5) is too good to be true. In
particular, agents respond to the incentives provided by individual accounts only if they
are forward-looking. Empirical evidence suggests that some agents are in fact myopic. For
example, in a panel study of consumption behavior in five industrial countries, Campbell
and Mankiw (1991) estimate that only between 60 and 80 percent of consumers are
forward-looking. If we multiply the assumed labour-supply elasticities in (4.1) by a factor
of 0.6 as an ad hoc way of accounting for myopic behavior, we obtain dR/ewh = 0.003.
Thus, even with a significant degree of myopia, the reform would still be fully self-
financing.
It may be argued that, by neglecting income eﬀects, our analysis tends to overstate
the positive eﬀect of the reform, since the positive IA balances will exert a negative
income eﬀect on labour supply. However, one should take into account that we have also
abstracted from the fact that lower eﬀective tax and benefit rates will tend to reduce
structural unemployment and may stimulate human capital formation. Moreover, recent
empirical studies suggest that income eﬀects on labour supply are very small indeed.
Overall then, it does not seem at all farfetched to claim that the introduction of IAs has
the potential to generate a Pareto improvement.
The decomposition of the budgetary impact in (4.5) allows a quantification of the
eﬃciency gains from the introduction of IAs. The revenue generated by the labour-
supply response to the reform is roughly equal to the increase in labour supply times
the tax and benefit wedge between the marginal productivity of labour and the marginal
disutility of work. To a first-order approximation, this product reflects the eﬃciency gain
from the reform if we abstract from involuntary unemployment.15 It is given by the sum
of the last three figures on the right-hand side of (4.5), amounting to 3.2 percent of the
15In the presence of structural unemployment, an increase in employment increases welfare by more
than the additional government revenues on account of a broader tax base and a narrower benefit base.
Hence, the welfare gains as computed here provide a lower bound for the actual welfare improvements.
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tax base. Another way of decomposing the welfare gain is to note that, by the Envelope
Theorem, the eﬀect of the reform on individual welfare is equal to minus the mechanical
eﬀect on revenue, i.e. 1.6 percent of the tax base. In addition, the reform improves the
budget by 1.6 percent of the tax base, implying a total welfare gain of 3.2 percent of
the tax base if the extra revenue is channelled back to the private sector in a lump-sum
manner.
4.4. Alternative schemes
The saving accounts we have simulated in this paper are designed to ensure that nobody
loses from the accounts ex post. Hence, we take the status quo as the starting point and
explore whether we can establish a Pareto improvement, not only from an ex-ante but
also from an ex-post perspective. Others have proposed other types of individual saving
accounts. Just as we do, Fölster (1999) takes the currently paid taxes as the point of
departure, reducing taxes by an amount corresponding to the mandatory contributions to
the IAs. However, Fölster’s scheme does not guarantee that nobody loses from the saving
system ex post. Instead, he calibrates the minimum guaranteed pension so as to ensure
that total pensions paid out under the account system (including the positive IA balances)
equal the total amount of pensions paid out under the present system. This means that
individuals who have a relatively high wage towards the end of their career (and who
would therefore be entitled to a relatively high pension under the current system) but
who nevertheless end up with a negative IA balance will tend to lose from the reform,
since they are entitled to only a relatively low minimum pension. Another diﬀerence with
the accounts we simulate is that Fölster (1999) finances the income guarantee through an
explicit insurance premium payable by everybody. As a consequence, marginal tax rates
remain positive for individuals who do not expect to benefit from the income guarantee.
Orzag and Snower (2002) focus on unemployment accounts. Workers would be re-
quired to put mandatory contributions in their unemployment account to finance with-
drawals when unemployed. Individuals with a zero balance would be entitled to unem-
ployment assistance. In addition, the contributions of workers earning low incomes could
be subsidized. These subsidies and unemployment assistance would be financed by taxes
on the contributions of of other workers. In this way, marginal taxes remain positive for
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all. Compared to the system we simulate, the tax rate on incomes is less non-linear so
that also the lifetime poor may face lower marginal tax rates and improved incentives to
contain moral hazard. At the same time, marginal tax rates remain positive also for those
earning middle incomes and higher incomes. Moreover, some lifetime poor individuals as
well as individuals who experience several bouts of unemployment during their life course
may lose from the introduction of individual accounts.
Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explore social-insurance accounts that are integrated with
the retirement system. Whereas the accounts raise expected utility ex ante, they do not
guarantee that all agents are better oﬀ ex post. In particular, agents who have suﬀered
frequent and lengthy spells of unemployment during their lives may end up with lower
retirement benefits than with unemployment benefits that are entirely financed through
taxes. Within this setting, Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explore which share of unemploy-
ment benefits should be optimally financed from saving accounts from the point of view
of maximizing ex-ante utility of the workers. They argue that explicit transfers from
high-skilled to low-skilled workers could mimic the transfers between these groups im-
plicit in the current unemployment insurances without undoing the eﬃciency gains from
individual accounts in combatting moral hazard.
Leijnse et al. (2004) propose a three pillar system. The first pillar resembles the trans-
fer programs we do not include in the IA system. It remains completely tax financed.
The third pillar includes voluntary saving schemes. The second pillar involves mandatory
contributions to individual accounts that oﬀer neither a lifetime income guarantee nor
liquidity insurance. As a direct consequence, some individuals who make frequent with-
drawals and exhaust their accounts would lose ex post. The second pillar, however, would
be a mixture between insurance and saving. Hence, on a sectoral level, social partners can
force workers to use part of their contributions to buy insurance. In that case, potential
ex-post losses would be contained, as would be the potential welfare gains from reduced
moral hazard. Indeed, the optimal mix between saving and insurance would depend on
the scope for moral hazard. In particular, the share of saving and self-insurance would
increase if individuals bear a larger personal responsibility for an event.
In summary, there are many possible ways of designing a system of individual ac-
counts for social insurance. Comparing the costs and benefits of alternative designs is an
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interesting topic for future research, but a systematic comparison goes beyond the scope
of this paper.
5. Concluding remarks
Our analysis suggests that individual accounts can play a useful role in financing social
benefits that have only little redistributive power in a life-cycle perspective and give
rise to serious moral hazard. For such benefits, saving accounts can enhance labor-
market incentives at a relatively low cost in terms of a more unequal distribution of
lifetime incomes. This is especially so if saving accounts are accompanied by labor-market
institutions that combat long-term employment and facilitate rapid turnover and by
social policies that provide a life-time income guarantee and ensure an equal distribution
of human capital at the beginning of life. As the changing nature of social risks makes
social insurance more expensive in terms of distorted labor-market incentives, individual
accounts with a lifetime income guarantee seem to be an attractive alternative to simple
cuts in tax and benefits. Indeed, such accounts can continue to provide substantial
income security at a time when a dynamic world economy confronts many people with
substantial risks. In this way, they can help protect the social legitimacy of a competitive
market system that stimulates innovation and growth but also gives rise to substantial
risks associated with creative destruction.
Apart from the changing nature of social risks and the continued demand for income
security, several factors have made individual accounts in social insurance more attractive.
First of all, modern information and communication technologies enable governments to
keep systematic records of the contribution and withdrawal histories of their citizens.
Second, more eﬃcient capital markets allow individuals to smooth their consumption
over their life courses. By thus allowing individuals to decouple annual consumption
from annual disposable incomes, better functioning capital markets make lifetime- rather
than annual incomes better indicators of overall welfare. Moreover, financial innovation
allows private financial institutions to administer the compulsory saving accounts. A
further reason for the increased attractiveness of individual accounts is that they are
fully portable between jobs. Hence, social insurance does not tie workers to their initial
employer. This facilitates labour mobility and the flexibility of the labour market. It is
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also consistent with the emancipation of the worker, who becomes more independent of
specific employers. Finally, many social-insurance programs suﬀer from the problem that
it is hard to separate the truly needy from other individuals who do not really need help
from the government. If social norms regarding the take-up of benefits are endogenous
and the take-up rate depends positively on how many people already receive benefits (as
argued by Lindbeck (2006)), individual accounts may improve the sustainability of the
welfare state by inducing people not to take up social benefits unless they really need
them. This helps to halt an erosion of social norms. With individual accounts reducing
moral hazard for middle- and higher incomes, the government can focus its active labor-
market policies more on the life-time poor, thereby also protecting the social norms of
this group.
Individual accounts also have implications that have not been included in our formal
analysis. By separating lifetime redistribution from consumption-smoothing and insur-
ance, individual accounts increase the transparency of lifetime redistribution. This may
weaken the political support for this redistribution. Another factor that may work in the
same direction is that the middle class no longer benefits from redistribution, which is
now more closely targeted at the lifetime poor. At the same time, however, individual
accounts give individuals a stronger sense of ownership and personal responsibility. This
may strengthen popular support for the welfare state and the liquidity and lifetime in-
surance it provides. Stronger personal ownership may also make it more diﬃcult for the
government to change benefit rules, thereby reducing political risks.
The lifetime income insurance built into the system limits the cuts in eﬀective social
benefits to high- and middle incomes in order to contain the possible adverse eﬀects on
the incomes of the lifetime poor. This may encourage the middle and higher income
earners to lobby for stronger employment protection, thereby harming the flexibility of
the labor market. The lifetime income guarantee implies also that, while marginal rates
are cut for others, marginal tax rates remain large only for the lifetime poor.16 The
employment gap between low-skilled and high-skilled workers may thus increase unless
16A related drawback is that, although the lifetime poor may not become worse oﬀ in absolute terms,
they may become poorer compared to the lifetime rich. This is a serious drawback if people care more
about relative incomes than absolute incomes. In the presence of such standard-of-living utilities, optimal
marginal tax rates at the top of the income distribution would be positive.
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the government focuses active labour-market policies on the bottom of the labour market
and employs instruments other than financial incentives to activate the lifetime poor.
Hence, in contrast to those with higher lifetime incomes, these individuals may face more
government intrusion in their private lives and are less free to make their own sovereign
decisions.
If individuals lack the willpower or cognitive abilities to smooth consumption over
their lifetimes, then annual disposable income becomes an important welfare indicator in
addition to lifetime income. Accordingly, the government should base its redistributive
policies not only on lifetime incomes (on the basis of the balances in individual accounts),
but also on disposable incomes at each point in time. Intuitively, in the presence of myopia
the government cannot rely on individuals to allocate their lifetime incomes optimally
over their life course. In practice, while some consumers are myopic, others seem to
be forward-looking, as mentioned earlier. This suggests that the optimal redistribution
policy should be based on annual as well as lifetime incomes.
The analysis in this paper indicates that mandatory individual savings accounts can be
a useful component of an overall social policy package. In addition to equal opportunities
at the start of life through an equal distribution of human capital, such a policy package
should provide some form of life-time income guarantee. By using information on lifetime
incomes, redistribution implicit in such an income guarantee can occur at lower eﬃciency
costs. Moreover, actuarially fair links between contributions and expected benefits alle-
viate the labor-market distortions associated with social insurance for middle- and high
incomes. Finally, by facilitating consumption-smoothing through saving schemes oﬀering
liquidity insurance, the government increases the scope for self-insurance, thereby com-
bating moral hazard in social insurance. Through all these channels, saving accounts
support social policy by reducing the costs that are associated with an eﬀective mix of
redistribution, social insurance and consumption smoothing.
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Technical appendix
A.1. The eﬀects of individual savings accounts on the public budget
This section derives the formulas (4.1) and (4.2) that were used in section 5.3 to
estimate the revenue eﬀects of introducing IAs. We measure all variables in growth-
adjusted present-value terms, assuming that the growth-adjusted real interest rate on
government bonds is zero. Since individuals who end up with a deficit on their IA pay
the same taxes and receive the same transfers as under the current tax-transfer system,
we focus on those individuals who manage to accumulate a surplus on their IA at the date
of retirement. For simplicity, we abstract from any changes in the revenue from capital
income taxes stemming from changes in economic activity and in saving behavior.
Since real-world tax systems are piecewise linear, we assume a linear system of labour
income taxation where the tax bill (T ) of a person participating in the labour market is
T = τwh− I. (A.1)
Here τ is the marginal eﬀective tax rate on labour income, including social security taxes
as well as indirect taxes; w is the wage rate; h is the number of hours worked; and I is
’virtual’ income, i.e., a parameter that may be calibrated to obtain a realistic value of
the total average eﬀective tax rate on labour income, given the various deductions and
the form of the tax schedule imposed on intramarginal labor income.
Assuming a zero growth-adjusted real interest rate, and setting the total time available
up until the oﬃcial retirement age equal to unity, we can write the balance (A) on the
IA at that time as
A = sewh− αb (1− e) , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (A.2)
where s is the rate of mandatory contribution to the IA; e is the average labour force
participation rate over the active life of the representative wage earner with an IA surplus
(so that ewh is his/her total labour income); b is the average after-tax public transfer
received in periods of non-employment by people below the oﬃcial retirement age, and
α is the fraction of benefits to people of working age that is debited to the IAs.
Using (A.1) and (A.2), and assuming that the IA system is integrated in the public
budget, we can write the growth-adjusted present value of the total net revenue (R)
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collected from the representative member of a cohort with an IA surplus as17
R = eT + sewh− (1− e) b− P −A
= e (τwh− I)− (1− α) (1− e) b− P, (A.3)
where P is the ordinary retirement benefit granted to people above the oﬃcial retirement
age. We see from the second line in (A.3) that the contribution rate s has no revenue
eﬀect, because all contributions are eﬀectively remitted to individuals with a positive IA
balance.
The introduction of IAs means that part of the labour income tax is replaced by
a mandatory IA contribution and that part of the benefits received during periods of
non-employment is debited to the IA. In formal terms, such a reform thus implies a
cut in τ combined with a rise in s and α. We wish to estimate the revenue eﬀect of
introducing a system of IAs, starting from an initial situation without such a system
where A = s = α = 0. Using this initial condition and recalling that the proposed IA
system does not involve any change in ordinary retirement benefits (i.e., dP = 0), we
find from (A.3) that the revenue eﬀect of introducing IAs amounts to
dR =
mechanical eﬀectz }| {
ewh · dτ + b (1− e) · dα+
behavioral eﬀectz }| {
(T + b) · de+ τew · dh . (A.4)
17This specification assumes that contributions to the IA are not deductible; that IA balances are
not taxed, and that only net (after-tax) benefits are debited to the IA. The DEC proposal described in
section 4.1, in contrast, assumes that pre-tax benefits are debited to the IA and that IA contributions
are deductible from the personal income tax base whereas IA balances are subject to personal income
tax. In this case one can show that (A.3) modifies to
R = e (τwh− I)− (1− α) (1− e) b− P
+
¡
mA −mw
¢
sewh− α (1− e) b
µ
mA − tb
1− tb
¶
, (A.3.a)
where mA is the marginal personal tax rate on IA balances, mw is the marginal personal tax rate on
labour income, and tb is the average tax rate on benefit income. However, in the initial pre-reform
equilibrium we have s = α = 0, so to a first-order approximation, changes in e and h will have no
impact on R via the last two terms on the right-hand side of (A.3.a). Hence, an analysis based on (A.3)
approximates the revenue eﬀect of the reform.
Note also that all variables in (A.3) are measured after indirect taxes, so the revenue eﬀects of indirect
consumption taxes are implicitly included (see the specification of eﬀective tax rates in (A.8) below).
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The so-called ’mechanical eﬀect’ indicated in (A.4) is the hypothetical eﬀect on revenue
that would materialize if the IA reform did not aﬀect behavior. However, since the
reform reduces the eﬀective marginal and average tax rate on labour income as well as
the eﬀective benefit rate (because agents end up paying a fraction α of their own benefits
via a reduced IA balance), it will aﬀect labour force participation as well as the number
of hours worked by those who participate, as also indicated in (A.4). For simplicity, we
shall abstract from income eﬀects on labour supply, since most recent empirical studies
find that these eﬀects are very small.18 Income eﬀects will be absent if utility functions
take the quasi-linear form
U = C −D · [f (h) + q] , f 0 > 0, f 00 > 0,
where C is consumption, f (h) is the disutility of working h hours, q is a fixed (pecuniary
and/or psychological) cost of labour force participation, andD is a dummy variable taking
the value of unity when the individual participates in the labour market and the value
of zero when he/she does not participate. Following Immervoll et al. (2005), suppose q
varies in a smooth continuous manner within a group of workers earning the same wage
rate w. The participation rate of that group will then vary continuously with changes in
the variable
y ≡ who (1− τ) + I − b (1− α) , (A.5)
representing the diﬀerence between net income when working and net income when not
working, measured at the initial level of working hours, ho. Note that a marginal change
in h induced by a policy reform does not aﬀect the utility of an employed worker, since
the resulting change in consumption is oﬀset by a change in the disutility of work when
the initial working hours ho have been optimized (i.e., f 0 (ho) dh = dC = w (1− τ) dh in
the initial optimum). Hence, a change in h does not aﬀect the incentive to participate in
the labour market. This is why the variable y in (A.5) is measured at the given initial
level of working hours.
Turning to labour supply at the intensive margin, in the absence of income eﬀects the
working hours of an employed worker depend exclusively on the marginal after-tax wage
18For example, using Danish data, Frederiksen et al. (2001) estimate an average income elasticity of
around −0.005.
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rate, w (1− τ). Defining the elasticities
η ≡ de/e
dy/y
, (participation elasticity) ,
ε ≡ dh/h
dw (1− τ) /w (1− τ) , (hours-of-work elasticity),
we may write (A.4) as
dR = ewh · dτ + b (1− e) · dα+ η (T + b) · edy
y
+ ετewh · dw (1− τ)
w (1− τ) . (A.6)
Using
dw (1− τ) = −w · dτ,
y = who − (T + b) ,
dy = −who · dτ + b · dα,
and defining
t ≡ T
wh
, (average labour income tax rate),
c ≡ b
wh
, (replacement rate),
we can rewrite equation (A.6) as
dR
ewh
=
∙
1− ε
µ
τ
1− τ
¶
− η
µ
t+ c
1− t− c
¶¸
dτ + c
∙
1− e
e
+ η
µ
t+ c
1− t− c
¶¸
dα. (A.7)
Accounting for indirect taxes, we can write the eﬀective marginal and average tax
rates on labour income as
τ =
τd + tc
1 + tc
, t =
td + tc
1 + tc
, (A.8)
where τd and td are the marginal and average direct tax rates, respectively, and tc is the
overall eﬀective indirect tax rate on consumption. To apply formula (A.7), we also need
to account for the link between dτ and dα. We assume that the contribution to the IA
is matched by a corresponding reduction in the marginal labour income tax rate so that
ds = −dτ . In the absence of changes in labour supply behavior, and given that we start
out with so = αo = Ao = 0, the IA account balance for a person with a positive balance
will then be
A = ewh · ds− b (1− e) · dα = −ewh · dτ − b (1− e) · dα ⇐⇒
44
dα = −
µ
ewh
b (1− e)
¶µ
dτ +
A
ewh
¶
. (A.9)
For the average Danish household with an IA surplus, the data used to produce the
estimates presented in Table 6 imply that
Ap
ewh
= 0.035,
ewh
B (1− e) = 9.38,
where Ap is the average account balance before tax, and B is the average rate of pre-
tax benefit. In Denmark, transfer income is subject to the same tax schedule as labour
income. Hence we assume that benefits and labour income are taxed at the same rate so
that b = B (1− t). Moreover, when applying formula (A.9), we assume (in accordance
with the DEC proposal) that the account balance Ap is also taxed at the rate t, since
contributions to the IA are deductible from the labour income tax base (see also footnote
17). In formula (A.9) we thus set A/ewh = (1− t)Ap/ewh = (1− t) 0.035.
In a Danish context, plausible estimates for the eﬀective tax rates are
td = 0.42, τ d = 0.54, tc = 0.26.
The estimate for td is taken from the OECD Taxing Wages report (OECD (2005)) and
refers to the average Danish production worker. The estimate for the average value of
the marginal direct tax rate on labour income (τd) is taken from the Danish Ministry of
Finance (2004), and the estimate for tc is based on Carey and Rabesona (2004, Table
7.B2) and is an average figure for Denmark for the period 1990-2000.
We finally need to estimate c ≡ b/wh = B (1− t) /wh. In the Danish system of
unemployment insurance, the gross replacement rate B/wh was recently estimated by the
Confederation of Danish Trade Unions to be about 0.55 for the average production worker.
However, in many other transfer programs the average replacement rate is somewhat
lower, so we choose to set B/wh = 0.5.19 Using (A.8) and the estimates of td, τd and tc,
we then find
c = B (1− t) /wh = 0.23.
19Our estimated benefit rates b and B are averages across all individuals and social insurance programs,
regardless of whether or not the program is included in the IA system. Important programs such as social
assistance and ordinary retirement benefits have relatively low replacement rates. We are thus confident
that our procedure does not overestimate the average replacement rate in the programs included in the
IA system.
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Given these parameter values and some assumptions on the labour supply elasticities,
one may use the formulas (A.7) through (A.9) to estimate the revenue eﬀect of the IA
reform proposed by the Danish Economic Council. The resulting estimate is reported in
section 5.3 of the main text.
A.2. Incentive and welfare eﬀects of individual savings accounts for social
insurance
This section presents a simple formal framework to illustrate how the introduction of
individual accounts may enable the government to provide lifetime income insurance and
liquidity insurance in a more eﬃcient manner. Our framework is a simplified version of
the more elaborate model developed in Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004).
Individuals in our model economy live for two periods. During the first period each
employed person works full time, but a fraction of each young cohort is involuntarily
unemployed due to negative labour market shocks. All unemployment risks are borne by
young workers because jobs are rationed on a Last-In-First-Out basis. Young unemployed
workers are liquidity-constrained and thus undertake no savings during their youth. In
the second period of life, people choose to work only a fraction e of the time and are
retired from the labour force during the remaining fraction 1 − e of that period. We
assume that the retirement age chosen by the consumer is no lower than the age limit
entitling people to (early) retirement benefits. For simplicity, we take pre-tax factor
prices as given and abstract from taxes on capital income.
Household preferences and budget constraints
For all consumers in the economy, lifetime utility bU is given by the utility function
bU = U1 (C1) +µ 1
1 + δ
¶
[U2 (C2)− h (e)] (A.10)
U 0i > 0, U
00
i < 0, i = 1, 2; h
0 > 0, h00 > 0, δ > 0, 0 ≤ e ≤ 1
where Ui is instantaneous utility from consumption, C1 is first-period consumption, C2
is second-period consumption, δ is the rate of time preference, e is the second-period em-
ployment rate (the fraction of the second period during which the consumer works before
he retires), and h(e) is the disutility from second-period work. Since the working hours of
employed young workers are institutionally fixed, and since a young worker is either fully
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employed or fully unemployed, the disutility from first-period work is exogenous and is
therefore ignored in (A.10).
Households are divided into those who are exposed to involuntary unemployment
during their youth and those who are not. The latter group will be called ’high-income
earners’, denoted by superscript h. A high-income earner, who has an employment rate
of unity during the first period of his life, is subject to the budget constraints
Ch1 = w(1− t− s) + y1 − S, S ≥ 0, (A.11)
Ch2 = (1 + r)S + we
h (1− t− s) + y2
¡
1− eh
¢
+Ah, (A.12)
Ah = (1 + r) sw + sweh − α2y2
¡
1− eh
¢
, Ah ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α2 ≤ 1, (A.13)
wherew is the real wage rate before tax, t is the labour income tax rate, s is the mandatory
rate of social security contribution to the consumer’s individual account, y1 is an in-work
benefit available to young workers, S is financial saving (excluding the contribution to
the IA), r is the real interest rate (determined in the world capital market), y2 is an early
retirement benefit, and Ah is the balance on the consumer’s individual account that is
paid out in the second period when he retires. From (A.13), we see that this balance
consists of the contributions to the IA made during young age, with interest added,
(1 + r) sw, plus the contribution made in the second period, swe, minus the fraction
α2 of the early retirement benefit y2
¡
1− eh
¢
that is financed by debiting his individual
account. In the case of α2 = s = 0, we have a conventional tax-financed system of
social insurance without IAs. When α2 > 0, part of the individual’s (early) retirement
benefit is financed by withdrawals from his IA. The constraint Ah ≥ 0 reflects the lifetime
income insurance built into the IA system: if the balance on the IA is negative at the
time of retirement, the account is set at zero, and the individual still receives his ordinary
retirement benefit. The constraint S ≥ 0 indicates that the individual is unable to borrow
against his expected future labour and transfer income. For high-income earners who are
fully employed during their youth, we assume that the two constraints are not binding.
We may then consolidate (A.11) through (A.13) into the single lifetime budget constraint
Ch1 +
Ch2
1 + r
= w (1− t) + y1 +
weh (1− t) + y2 (1− α2)
¡
1− eh
¢
1 + r
. (A.14)
The social security tax rate s has dropped out of (A.14). This indicates that, for a
consumer who is never liquidity-constrained, the mandatory contribution to the IA is
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a perfect substitute for voluntary private saving and will hence leave his total saving
S+sw unchanged. Equation (A.14) also shows that, for an unconstrained consumer, the
introduction of IAs (a positive value of α2) amounts to a reduction in the eﬀective rate
of early retirement benefit, y2(1− α2), in addition to a cut in marginal and eﬀective tax
rate t.
The representative high-income earner maximizes lifetime utility (A.10) subject to
the budget constraint (A.14). The solution to this problem can be shown to yield an
indirect lifetime utility function of the form V h = V h (y1, t, y2, α2) with the derivatives
V hy1 ≡
∂V h
∂y1
= λh, V ht ≡
∂V h
∂t
= −λh
µ
w +
weh
1 + r
¶
, (A.15)
V hy2 ≡
∂V h
∂y2
=
λh (1− α2)
¡
1− eh
¢
1 + r
, V hα2 ≡
∂V h
∂α2
= −
λhy2
¡
1− eh
¢
1 + r
, (A.16)
where λh is the marginal utility of first-period income.
Those who are exposed to involuntary unemployment during the first period of life are
divided into ’low-income earners’ (denoted by superscript l) and ’medium-income earners’
(indicated by superscript m). For both groups, the income loss from unemployment is
so severe that the dissaving constraint S ≥ 0 becomes binding, implying that no savings
are made out of the net unemployment benefit b received during the first period. Hence
Ci1 = b, i = l,m. (A.17)
In the second period, a medium-income earner earns the normal wage rate w, which is
suﬃciently high to enable him to accumulate a surplus on his IA. Thus a medium-income
earner is subject to the second-period constraints
Cm2 = we
m (1− t− s) + y2 (1− em) +Am, (A.18)
Am = swem − αbb (1 + r)− α2y2 (1− em) , Am ≥ 0, (A.19)
where the term −αbb (1 + r) on the right-hand side of (A.19) is the net balance on the
IA carried over from the first to the second period (with interest added), given that a
fraction αb of the unemployment benefit received is debited to the IA. Inserting (A.19)
into (A.18) to eliminate Am, we obtain
Cm2 = we
m (1− t)− αbb (1 + r) + y2 (1− α2) (1− em) . (A.20)
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Equations (A.17) through (A.20) illustrate how the eﬀect of IAs diﬀers from the ef-
fect of a simple cut in the rate of unemployment benefit: a cut in b would force the
worker to reduce his consumption in the first period of life, when the marginal utility of
consumption is relatively high due to the liquidity constraint. By contrast, the introduc-
tion of individual unemployment accounts (an increase in αb from zero to some positive
number) would force a cut in consumption only in the second period when the marginal
utility cost would be lower (since the consumer can escape liquidity constraints in the
second period by postponing his date of retirement). This observation is one of the keys
to understanding the potential for welfare gains from IAs. We also note from (A.17)
and (A.20) that, as long as Am ≥ 0, the social security contribution s does not aﬀect
the behavior or welfare of the liquidity-constrained individual (since this contribution is
essentially money that he pays to himself).
The medium-income earner maximizes (A.10) subject to (A.17) and (A.20). This
yields an indirect utility function of the form V m = V m (b, t, y2, αb, α2) with derivatives
V mb ≡
∂V m
∂b
= λm1 −
λm2 αb (1 + r)
1 + δ
, V mt ≡
∂V m
∂t
= −λ
m
2 we
m
1 + δ
, (A.21)
V my2 ≡
∂V m
∂y2
=
λm2 (1− α2) (1− em)
1 + δ
, V mαb ≡
∂V m
∂αb
= −λ
m
2 b (1 + r)
1 + δ
,
V mα2 ≡
∂V m
∂α2
= −λ
m
2 y2 (1− em)
1 + δ
, (A.22)
where λm1 ≡ U 01 (b) is the marginal utility of first-period income, and λm2 is the marginal
utility of second-period income.
A low-income earner earns a wage rate θw (θ < 1), which is so low that he ends up
with a negative balance on his IA. Due to the lifetime income guarantee, his IA balance is
therefore set at zero at the time of retirement, implying a second-period budget constraint
C l2 = θwe
l (1− t− s) + y2
¡
1− el
¢
, (A.23)
yielding an indirect utility function of the form V l = V l (b, t, s) with the properties
V lb = λ
l
1 ≡ U 01 (b) , V lt = V ls = −
λl2we
l
1 + δ
, V ly2 =
λl2
¡
1− el
¢
1 + δ
. (A.24)
In this case, the mandatory social security contribution s works just like an ordinary
labour income tax.
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The government budget
The present value of the net taxes paid by a cohort over its life cycle is measured
by that cohort’s generational account. Treating the IA system as a part of the public
budget, and using (A.13), we may write the generational account of a cohort of high-
income earners (gh) as
gh = (t+ s)w − y1 +
(t+ s)weh − y2
¡
1− eh
¢
−Ah
1 + r
= tw − y1 +
tweh − y2 (1− α2)
¡
1− eh
¢
1 + r
. (A.25)
For a cohort of medium-income earners, we can use (A.19) to write the generational
account as
gm = −b+ (t+ s)we
m − y2 (1− em)−Am
1 + r
= −b (1− αb) +
twem − y2 (1− α2) (1− em)
1 + r
. (A.26)
Finally, for the low-income earners who do not manage to accumulate a surplus on
their IAs, the generational account amounts to
gl = −b+
(t+ s)wel − y2
¡
1− el
¢
1 + r
. (A.27)
Below we will use (A.25) through (A.27) to analyze how the introduction of IAs will
aﬀect the present value of net government revenue.
Lifetime income insurance through individual retirement accounts
Via the benefits b and y2, the tax-transfer system provides lifetime income insurance
to low-income earners by guaranteeing a minimum lifetime income. We will now show
that, by introducing IAs, the government can provide such insurance in a more eﬃcient
manner. Under the IA system, lifetime income insurance is ensured via the provision
that negative IA balances are simply cancelled at the time of retirement so that the net
benefits received can never fall below those oﬀered in the absence of IAs. To illustrate
the implications of this feature of the IA system in the most transparent manner, we will
now temporarily abstract from the group of medium-income earners — although our main
result goes through also in an economy with three income groups (see Bovenberg and
Sørensen (2004)).
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To prove that the introduction of IAs has the potential to generate a Pareto improve-
ment, we show that an IA reform designed to keep the utility of all individuals constant
will surely improve the public budget. In that case, the government is obviously able to
make everybody better oﬀ, for example by using the extra revenue to raise the universal
retirement benefit y2.20
Suppose that, starting from s = 0, the government introduces a mandatory contri-
bution to an individual retirement account while at the same time reducing the labour
income tax rate by a similar amount so that ds+ dt = 0, dt < 0. Recalling from (A.24)
that V lt = V
l
s , such a reform will keep the lifetime utility of low-income earners constant,
and according to (A.27) will have no impact on their generational account. Suppose
further that the fraction of retirement benefits that is required to be financed via the IA
(α2) is calibrated so as to keep the lifetime utility of high-income earners constant. Using
(A.15) and (A.16), we find that this requires
V ht · dt+ V hα2 · dα2 = 0 =⇒
dα2
dt
= −
∙
w (1 + r) + weh
y2 (1− eh)
¸
(A.28)
Diﬀerentiating (A.25), inserting (A.28), and recalling that α2 = 0 initially, we find that
the eﬀect of this reform on the generational account of high-income earners is
dgh =
µ
tw + y2
1 + r
¶µ
weh (2 + r)
y (1− eh)
¶
εhc · (−dt) , (A.29)
y ≡ w (1− t)− (1− α2) y2, εhc ≡
µ
∂eh
∂y
¶
c
· y
eh
,
where εhc is the compensated elasticity of a high-income earner’s second-period labour
supply with respect to the net reward to work (y), defined as the diﬀerence between the
after-tax wage rate and the net rate of retirement benefit. Since this elasticity measures
a pure substitution eﬀect, εhc is positive, and since we also have dt < 0, it follows from
(A.29) that the IA reform will boost net government revenue by inducing high-income
earners to postpone their retirement. Since the reform was designed to keep everybody’s
utility constant, it follows that the government can generate a Pareto improvement, say,
by channeling the extra revenue back to consumers via an increase in y2.21 Eﬀectively, the
20A similar procedure for the analysis of the welfare eﬀects of policy reforms was previously used by
Kaplow (1996) and Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004).
21Of course, this will to some extent dampen the positive eﬀect of the IA reform on labour supply.
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IA reform enables the government to engineer an eﬃciency-enhancing cut in taxes and
retirement benefits for high-income earners without aﬀecting the incentives and welfare
of low-income earners.
Lifetime income insurance through individual unemployment accounts
We will now show that the introduction of individual unemployment accounts will
also enable the government to oﬀer lifetime income insurance in a more eﬃcient way.
To illustrate the point, we must now include the medium-income earners in the analysis,
along with high-income and low-income earners. We follow the same procedure as before,
designing an IA reform that will keep everybody’s utility constant and demonstrating that
this reform will improve the public budget, thus allowing a Pareto improvement.
The introduction of unemployment accounts involves raising s and αb from zero to
some positive amounts while at the same time reducing t. To keep the utility and the
generational account of low-income earners constant, we maintain the assumption that
ds+dt = 0, dt < 0. The derivatives V mt and V
m
αb in (A.21) and (A.22) indicate the eﬀects
of the changes in t and αb on the welfare of medium-income earners. These expressions
reveal that a constant utility for this group requires
dαb
dt
= − we
m
b (1 + r)
. (A.29)
Finally, using the expressions for V ht and V
h
y1 in (A.15) and (A.16), we keep the utility
of high-income earners constant by adjusting the in-work benefit y1 so that
dy1
dt
= w +
weh
1 + r
(A.30)
Diﬀerentiating (A.25) and (A.26) and using (A.29) and (A.30), we now find that
dgi =
µ
tw + y2
1 + r
¶µ
wei
y
¶
εic · (−dt) > 0, εic ≡
µ
∂ei
∂y
¶
c
y
ei
> 0, i = m,h, (A.31)
where εic is the compensated second-period labour supply elasticity of group i. Hence,
by eﬀectively allowing a selective tax cut for medium- and high-income earners, the
introduction of unemployment accounts generates a higher labour supply from these two
groups, thereby boosting public net revenue and enabling the government to engineer a
Pareto improvement.
Note that even though the unemployment accounts reduce the present value of the
net unemployment benefits paid out to medium-income earners, the IA system does not
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reduce the consumption possibilities of these individuals during the first period when
they are liquidity-constrained. Indeed, we shall now show that unemployment accounts
enable the government to provide liquidity insurance in a more eﬃcient manner than
through the conventional tax-transfer system.
Liquidity insurance through unemployment accounts
To demonstrate this result in the simplest possible manner, we abstract from the group
of low-income earners, but once again we emphasize that the qualitative result carries
over to an economy with three income groups, as shown in Bovenberg and Sørensen
(2004).
Under a traditional tax-transfer system, the liquidity constraints of unemployed work-
ers may be alleviated through a tax-financed rise in unemployment benefits. The welfare
eﬀect of such a reform may be measured by its impact on the public budget, assuming
that the reform is designed to keep everyone’s utility constant. For a medium-income
earner, (A.21) reveals that a constant utility level requires
V mb · db+ V mt · dt = 0 =⇒
db
dt
=
λm2 we
m
λm1 (1 + δ)
. (A.32)
Notice that while (A.32) ensures that a medium-income earner’s lifetime utility is kept
constant, this is achieved by raising his first-period utility through a rise in b and lowering
his second-period utility by raising t. With a binding first-period liquidity constraint, the
medium-income earner will not want to compensate for the fall in second-period utility
by shifting consumption from the first to the second period; the reform will thus induce
an uncompensated second-period labour-supply response, which may be decomposed via
the Slutsky equation
∂em
∂t
=
µ
∂em
∂t
¶
c
− wem
µ
∂em
∂I
¶
, (A.33)
where
¡
∂em
∂t
¢
c
is the substitution eﬀect and−wem
¡
∂em
∂I
¢
is the income eﬀect. From (A.26),
(A.32) and (A.33) we find the following impact of the tax-financed rise in unemployment
benefits on the medium-income earner’s generational account,
dgm =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
liquidity insurance eﬀectz }| {"
λm1
λm2
¡
1+r
1+δ
¢ − 1# −µλm1 (1 + δ)
λm2
¶µ
tw + y2
1 + r
¶ labour supply eﬀectz }| {µ
emεmI
I
+
εmc
y
¶⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
db, (A.34)
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εmI ≡
∂em
∂I
I
em
< 0,
where εmI is the income elasticity of labour supply which is negative under the assump-
tion that leisure is a normal good. With a binding liquidity constraint in the first period,
the magnitude λm1 /λ
m
2
¡
1+r
1+δ
¢
will be greater than one, so the positive term in the square
bracket in (A.34) reflects the eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀect of improved liquidity insurance
via higher unemployment benefits. The higher labour income tax rate associated with
higher benefits will have a negative impact on the medium-income earner’s second-period
labour supply, however, assuming that the substitution eﬀect (reflected in the compen-
sated labour supply elasticity εmc ) dominates the income eﬀect (captured by ε
m
I ). Hence,
the overall net eﬀect on the medium-earner’s generational account is uncertain.
The high-income earner’s utility is kept constant by adjusting the in-work benefit
y1 in accordance with (A.30). This means that the impact on the high-income earner’s
generational account will still be given by the expression in (A.31). However, since we
now have dt > 0, the eﬀect will be negative, reflecting the eﬃciency loss from the larger
tax distortion to the labour supply of high-income earners (note that since high-income
earners are not liquidity-constrained, the relevant labour supply elasticity in (A.31) is
still the compensated elasticity, which is unambiguously positive).
Suppose now that, instead of being financed through higher taxes, the rise in the rate
of unemployment benefit is financed by debiting a fraction of the benefit to an individual
unemployment account, with the net balance being paid out when the consumer retires.22
Since high-income earners experience no unemployment, they will be unaﬀected by such
a reform; their IA contributions will simply be returned to them with interest when
they retire. Financing the rise in unemployment benefits via individual unemployment
accounts thus sidesteps the negative impact on the high-income earner’s labour supply
occurring under tax finance.
Consider next the medium-income earners. From (A.21) and (A.22) it follows that a
reform satisfying
V mb · db+ V mαb · dαb = 0 =⇒
dαb
db
=
λm1 (1 + δ)
λm2 b (1 + r)
(A.35)
22We assume that the social security contribution s is suﬃciently high to ensure a positive IA balance
at the date of retirement.
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will keep the lifetime utility of this group constant, but the debiting of the fraction αb of
the unemployment benefit to the IA will have a positive income eﬀect on second-period
labour supply:
∂em
∂αb
= −b (1 + r) · ∂e
m
∂I
> 0. (A.36)
Using (A.26), (A.35) and (A.36), we obtain
dgm =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
liquidity insurance eﬀectz }| {"
λm1
λm2
¡
1+r
1+δ
¢ − 1# −µλm1 (1 + δ)
λm2
¶µ
tw + y2
1 + r
¶ labour supply eﬀectz }| {µ
emεmI
I
¶ ⎫⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
db. (A.37)
Since εmI < 0, we see that the impact on the medium-income earner’s generational account
is now unambiguously positive, enabling the government to create a Pareto improvement.
Moreover, comparing (A.34) and (A.37), we observe that the IA-financed rise in unem-
ployment benefits yields a stronger positive impact on gm than the tax-financed rise in
benefits, since finance via unemployment accounts avoids the tax distortion on labour
supply. Recalling that dgh < 0 under tax finance whereas dgh = 0 under finance via
IAs, we may therefore conclude that it is more eﬃcient to oﬀer liquidity insurance by
financing a rise in unemployment benefits through unemployment accounts than through
higher taxes.
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                  Table 1. The distribution of annual income and lifetime income in Denmark (2002 income levels)1
 
 D1 D2 D3       D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Average2 Gini coefficient
Annual income (2002 cross section)             
Factor income -2 11 36 62 85 103 122 143 172 269 100 0.438 
Gross income3 36        64 78 91 104 118 133 151 178 275 123 0.288
Disposable income            27 48 57 64 71 78 86 96 109 158  79 0.242
Lifetime income4             
Factor income 31 56 69 80 90 100 110 123 142 198 100 0.253 
Gross income3 77      93 102 110 117 124 133 144 161 214 128 0.160
Disposable income             56 64 69 74 77 81 85 91 99 125  82 0.127
 
1. Average factor incomes have been normalized to 100. All incomes are measured according to an equivalence scale allowing for economies of scale in 
household consumption.  
2. Average income across the entire sample population.   
3. Factor income plus pre-tax public transfers received.  
4. Average income per year in the life cycle. 
 
Source: Hansen (2005, Table 5.2). 
 Table 2. The distribution of social transfers across annual income deciles (percent of disposable annual income, 2002 cross section) 
 
Transfer program D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Average1 
Social assistance 15.8 8.5 2.5 0.9 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 
Housing benefits 0.6 2.3 3.6 2.9 1.3 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Disability benefits 1.9 4.3 6.3 6.4 6.9 3.7 2.8 1.5 0.9 0.3 3.0 
Sickness benefits 2.1 2.7 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.2 1.2 
Unemployment benefits 4.1 4.5 5.0 4.5 3.5 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.4 0.7 2.5 
Child benefits 6.5 4.6 3.6 3.5 3.2 2.7 2.2 1.6 1.0 0.6 2.3 
Education benefits 18.9 3.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.2 
Parental leave benefits 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 
Early retirement benefits 1.0 3.2 6.0 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.4 1.8 0.9 2.9 
Ordinary retirement benefits2 8.5 28.9 25.9 16.6 8.9 6.1 4.2 2.9 2.2 1.8 8.1 
 
1. Average across the entire sample population.  
2. Basic plus supplementary retirement benefits.   
 
Source: Hansen (2005, Table 5.3) 
 
       Table 3. The distribution of social transfers across lifetime income deciles (percent of disposable lifetime income) 
 
Transfer program D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Average1 
Social assistance 6.9 2.4 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 1.2 
Housing benefits 2.8 2.0 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.8 
Disability benefits 12.2 8.2 5.8 3.8 2.9 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.0 0.6 3.3 
Sickness benefits 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Unemployment benefits 4.0 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.4 
Child benefits 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.2 
Education benefits 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 
Parental leave benefits 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Early retirement benefits 4.3 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.6 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.8 1.6 3.8 
Ordinary retirement benefits2 13.7 12.8 11.6 10.5 9.4 8.6 7.8 7.0 6.1 4.8 8.6 
 
1. Average across the entire sample population.  
2. Basic plus supplementary retirement benefits.   
 
Source: Hansen (2005, Table 5.4). 
 
Table 4. The normalized redistribution index for Danish transfer programs
 
 
Transfer 
program 
 
Annual 
Income1 
 
Lifetime 
Income1 
Percentage share 
of total spending on 
social transfers (2004)2 
 
Social assistance 0.70 0.47 6.2 
Housing benefits 0.35 0.39 4.4 
Disability benefits 0.14 0.39 13.8 
Supplementary retirement benefits 0.37 0.19 n.a. 
Sickness benefits 0.19 0.18 8.3 
Unemployment benefits 0.09 0.11 9.7 
Child benefits 0.13 0.10 8.0 
Education benefits 0.68 0.04 5.3 
Early retirement benefits 0.00 0.04 10.8 
Parental leave benefits 0.22 0.02 0.1 
Basic retirement benefit 0.22 0.00 28.13 
 
1. Excess value of the redistribution index over the redistribution index for a uniform lump sum transfer. 
2. The table excludes a number of minor programs accounting for 5.3 percent of total spending on social transfers. 
3. Sum of basic and supplementary retirement benefits. 
 
Sources: Hansen (2005, Tables 5.5 and 6.2) and Statistics Denmark (2005, Table 2).  
Table 5. Interpersonal versus intrapersonal redistribution in Denmark (1,000 euros, 2002 income levels)1
 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9  D10 Average2 
. Accumulated lifetime factor income 470 795 991 1146 1287 1421 1576 1755 2030 2859 1433 
. Taxes ‘reserved’ for social insurance (∑tTit) 211 277 311 338 363 388 418 454 512 711 398 
. Transfers received over the life cycle (∑tBit) 546 521 477 434 399 377 348 324 295 262 398 
. Self-financed transfers received in the same year (∑tSYit) 155 171 171 168 167 167 167 169 173 180 169 
. Self-financed transfers received in another year (OYi)  54 101 130 149 159 163 157 143 117  81 125 
. For Ni>0: Net transfers received over the life cycle 
3.-4.-5.= Ni) 
337 249 176 117 73 46 24 11   4 1 104 
. For Ni≤0: Net taxes paid over the life cycle 
2.-4.-5.= -Ni) 
  2   5  10  20  37  58  94 142 221 450 104 
 
1.  All magnitudes are total amounts accumulated over the life cycle, assuming a zero growth-adjusted real discount rate.  
2. Average across the entire sample population.  
 
Source: Hansen (2005, Table 5.7). 
 
Table 6. Average payments to and from the individual accounts and account 
balances at the time of retirement across lifetime income deciles1 
 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 Average 
Lifetime income (index) 62 79 86 92 97 102 107 113 121 141 100 
Accumulated payment into account in percent 
of accumulated withdrawal from account 
 
34 56 72 84 97 109 123 141 161 210 100 
After-tax account balance at retirement2 in percent
of accumulated lifetime disposable income3 
 
0.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 3.3 1.6 
Percent of adult population with positive 
account balance 
7.2 17.1 27.7 36.3 43.0 51.2 57.2 65.8 71.0 79.7 45.6 
 
1. The estimates assume a zero growth-adjusted real interest rate and unchanged behaviour.  
2. Average account balance across the entire sample population, where negative account balances have been set to zero. 
3. Accumulated income up until the official retirement age of 65; average across the entire sample population 
 
Source: Hansen (2005, Table 6.4). 
 
